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ABSTRACT. We prove that zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric infor-
mation admit a value in randomised stopping times when the stopping payoffs of the players are general
càdlàg measurable processes. The main novelties are that we do not assume a Markovian nature of the game
nor a particular structure of the information available to the players. This allows us to go beyond the vari-
ational methods (based on PDEs) developed in the related literature on Dynkin games in continuous time
with partial/asymmetric information. Instead, we focus on a probabilistic and functional analytic approach
based on the general theory of stochastic processes and Sion’s min-max theorem (M. Sion, Pacific J. Math.,
8, 1958, pp. 171-176). Our framework encompasses examples found in the literature on continuous time
Dynkin games with asymmetric information and we provide counterexamples to show that our assumptions
cannot be further relaxed.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we develop a framework for the study of the existence of a value in zero-sum Dynkin
games (also known as Stackelberg equilibrium) with partial/asymmetric information in a non-Markovian
setting, when the payoffs are general càdlàg processes and players are allowed to use randomised stopping
times. The games are considered on both finite and infinite-time horizon and the horizon is denoted by T .
The payoff processes can be decomposed into the sum of a regular process (in the sense of Meyer [32])
and a pure jump process with mild restrictions on the direction of predictable jumps for one of the two
players. Regular processes form a very broad class encompassing, for example, all càdlàg processes that
are also quasi left-continuous (i.e., left-continuous over stopping times).
We allow for a very general structure of the information available to the players. All processes are
adapted to an overarching filtration (Ft) whereas each player makes decisions based on her own filtration,
representing her access to information. Letting (F it ) be filtration of the i-th player, with i = 1, 2, we only
need to assume that F it ⊆ Ft for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, we cover the case in which players are
equally (partially) informed, i.e., F1t = F2t , or, more importantly, the case in which they have asymmetric
(partial) information, i.e., F1t 6= F2t .
Under this generality we prove that Dynkin games in the form of war-of-attrition admit a value in mixed
strategies (which in this context are represented by randomised stopping times). War-of-attrition refers to
the fact that each player has a second mover advantage. This is a canonical class of Dynkin games whose
complement are the so-called pre-emption games, in which players have a first-mover advantage.
Our framework encompasses most (virtually all) examples of zero-sum Dynkin games (in continuous
time) with partial/asymmetric information that we could find in the literature (see, e.g., De Angelis et al.
[10], [11], Gensbittel and Grün [21], Grün [22] and Lempa and Matomäki [30]) and we give a detailed
account of this fact in Section 3 (notice that [10] and [30] obtain equilibria for the game in pure strategies,
i.e., using stopping times, but in very special examples). Broadly speaking, all those papers’ solution
methods hinge on variational inequalities and PDEs and share two key features: (i) a specific structure of
the information flow in the game and (ii) the Markovianity assumption. In our work instead we are able to
analyse the games at a more abstract level that allows us to drop the Markovianity assumption and to avoid
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specifying an information structure. We also show by several counterexamples that our main assumptions
cannot be further relaxed as otherwise a value for the game may no longer exist.
Our methodology draws on the idea presented in Touzi and Vieille [45] of using Sion’s min-max the-
orem (Sion [40]). In [45] the authors are interested in non-Markovian zero-sum Dynkin games with full
information in which first- and second-mover advantage may occur at different points in time, depending
on the stochastic dynamics of the underlying payoff processes. In that context randomisation is essentially
used by the players to attain a value in the game and avoid stopping simultaneously (another general study
on such class of problems, but without using Sion’s theorem, is contained in Laraki and Solan [29]). Since
our set-up is different, due to the partial/asymmetric information features and to relaxed assumptions on
the pay-off processes, we encounter some non-trivial technical difficulties in repeating arguments from
[45] due to a lack of closedness of our class of randomised stopping times with respect to the topology
used in [45] (see Remark 5.16). For this reason we develop an alternative approach based on the general
theory of stochastic processes combined with ideas from functional analysis.
1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Existence of a value (Stackelberg equilirbium) in zero-sum Dynkin games is a research question that
goes back to the 70’s in the classical set-up where players have full and symmetric information. A com-
prehensive and informative review of the main results since Dynkin’s inception of stopping games [15] is
contained in the survey paper by Kifer [26]. Here we recall that early results on the existence of a value in
diffusive set-up were obtained by Bensoussan and Friedman [4], via PDE methods, and by Bismut [5] by
probabilistic methods (and allowing for processes with jumps). Those results were later extended to right-
continuous, homogeneous Markov processes by Stettner [42] (see also Stettner’s [43] and [44]). In the
non-Markovian setting the early results are due to Lepeltier and Maingueneau [31]. Around the year 2000
zero-sum Dynkin games have gained popularity also thanks to their applications in mathematical finance
suggested by Kifer [25] (see also Kyprianou [28] for an early contribution). Numerous other papers have
addressed related questions, including existence of optimal strategies and Nash equilibria, with various
methods. The interested reader may consult Ekström and Peskir [16] for modern results in a general Mar-
kovian setting or Ekström and Villeneuve [17] for the special case of one dimensional linear diffusions. It
is also worth mentioning that nonzero-sum Dynkin games have been studied by many authors including,
e.g., Hamadene and Zhang [23] for non-Markovian games, Attard for general Markovian games [2] and
De Angelis et al. [12] for games on one dimensional linear diffusions. All the papers mentioned in this
(largely incomplete) literature review deal with players holding full and symmetric information and the
value is found in pure strategies, i.e., in stopping times.
Yasuda [46] was probably the first to study the existence of a value for Dynkin games with randomised
stopping times, in the case of discrete-time Markov processes. In that context, randomisation is specified
by assigning a probability of stopping at each time n = 1, 2, . . .. A similar type of games for Markov
chains with an absorbing state were also studied by Domansky [14]. Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [38]
developed more general results by removing the Markovianity assumption and the assumption of an or-
dering in the payoffs (i.e., they no longer considered a war-of-attrition). Randomised stopping times are
also used in mathematical finance, in the context of pricing and hedging game options in discrete time
with transaction costs (see [26, Sec. 5]), and in mathematical economics, to construct subgame-perfect
equilibria in (nonzero-sum) Dynkin games (see, e.g., Riedel and Steg [36]). In continuous time, the most
recent results on the existence of a value for non-Markovian zero-sum Dynkin games with randomised
stopping times are contained in Touzi and Vieille [45] and in Laraki and Solan [29].
We emphasise that in all the papers mentioned above players are equally informed and the need for
randomisation stems mainly from a specific structure of the game’s payoff (often due to the lack of an
ordering of the payoff processes that induces alternating war-of-attrition and pre-emption features). Our
work instead is inspired by a more recent strand of the literature on continuous-time Dynkin games that
addresses the role of information across players and its impact on their strategies (see also Section 3 for
a fuller account). We believe this strand initiated with work by Grün [22], where one of the players
knows the payoff process in the game while the other one has only access to an initial distribution of
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possible payoff processes. Grün proves existence of a value in randomised strategies and the existence
of an optimal strategy for the informed player. In Grün and Gensbittel [21] players observe two different
stochastic processes but the payoffs in the game depend on both processes. The authors prove existence
of a value and, under some additional conditions, of optimal strategies for both players. Both these papers
attack the problem via a characterisation of the value as the viscosity solution of a certain variational
inequality (of a type which is rather new in the literature and is inspired to similar results in the context
of differential games; see, e.g., Cardaliaguet and Rainer [9]). Free boundary methods in connection with
randomised stopping times are instead used in De Angelis et al. [11], where players have asymmetric
information regarding the drift of a linear diffusion underlying the game, and in Ekström et al. [18],
where the two players estimate the drift parameter according to two different models. The methods used
in those papers cannot be extended to the non-Markovian framework of our paper.
Although not directly related to Dynkin games, we notice that methods from functional analysis and the
general theory of stochastic processes have been used recently to study optimal stopping problems by Pen-
nanen and Perkkïo [33]. Relaxing the problem to include randomised stopping times the authors reduce
the optimal stopping problem to an optimisation of a linear functional over a convex set of randomised
stopping times and find that the solution exists as an extremal point, i.e., a pure stopping time. Closely
related contributions date back to Baxter and Chacon [3] and Meyer [32] who establish compactness of the
set of randomised stopping times in weak topologies defined by functionals which can be interpreted as
stopping of quasi left-continuous processes, in [3], and regular processes, in [32]. In our game framework
we need to rely on min-max arguments, instead of convex optimisation as in the optimal stopping case,
so compactness arguments are not immediately applicable. However, [3, 32] inspired our approach and
some of our convergence results in Section 5.1.
1.2. STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
The paper is organised as follows. The problem is set in Section 2 where we also state our main result
on the existence of a value in full generality (Theorem 2.4). For the ease of readability we also state a
version of the result under slightly stronger conditions on the underlying processes (Theorem 2.5), which
allows a more linear approach to the proof. An extension to the case of a game with conditioning on some
initial information is also stated as Theorem 2.6. Before starting to prove our results we use Section 3 to
illustrate how our framework encompasses Dynkin games in continuous time with partial and asymmetric
information that appeared in the literature to date. Section 4 is used to reformulate the Dynkin game in
terms of a game of increasing (singular) controls. Section 5 begins with a statement of Sion’s min-max
theorem which is followed by a (short) proof of our Theorem 2.5. The latter is based on two technical
results which are addressed in detail in Sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. The proof of Theorem 2.4 is then given
in Section 5.4 and the one of Theorem 2.6 is finally given in Section 5.5. We close the paper with a few
counterexamples in Section 6 showing that our conditions cannot be relaxed.
2. PROBLEM SETTING AND MAIN RESULTS
Fix a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ], where T ∈ (0,∞] is
the time horizon of our problem. All random variables, processes and stopping times are considered on
this filtered probability space unless specified otherwise. We write E for the expectation EP with respect
to measure P. By a measurable process we mean a stochastic process which is B([0, T ])×F-measurable.
We denote by Lb a Banach space of càdlàg measurable processes with the norm
‖X‖Lb := E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|
]
<∞.
A process (Xt) ∈ Lb is called regular if
E[Xη −Xη−|Fη−] = 0 P-a.s. for all previsible (Ft)-stopping times η.
Notice that if T = ∞, then ∞ is a one-point compactification of [0,∞), so that càdlàg and regular
processes are understood as follows (c.f. [13, Remark VI.53e]): a process (Xt)t∈[0,∞] is càdlàg if it is
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càdlàg on [0,∞) and the limit X∞− := limt→∞Xt exists; the random variable X∞ if F∞-measurable
and F∞ is potentially different from F∞− = ∪t∈[0,∞)Ft. Furthermore, (Xt)t∈[0,∞] is regular, if it is
regular on [0,∞) and
E[X∞ − lim
t→∞Xt|F∞−] = 0.
Throughout the paper we consider several filtrations and stochastic processes, so in order to keep the
notation simple we will often use (Ft) instead of (Ft)t∈[0,T ] and similarly (Xt) for a process (Xt)t∈[0,T ].
We consider two-player zero-sum Dynkin games on the (possibly infinite) horizon T . Actions of the
first player are based on the information contained in a filtration (F1t ) ⊆ (Ft). Actions of the second
player are based on the information contained in a filtration (F2t ) ⊆ (Ft). Each player selects a random
time based on the information she acquires via her filtration: the first player’s random time is denoted by
τ while the second player’s random time is σ. The game terminates at time τ ∧ σ ∧ T with the first player
delivering to the second player the payoff
(1) P(τ, σ) = fτI{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + gσI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + hI{σ=T}∩{τ=T}.
The first player (or τ -player) is the minimiser in the game whereas the second player (or σ-player) is the
maximiser. That means that the former will try to minimise the expected payoff while the latter will try to
maximise it (see (2) below).
The payoff processes f and g, and the terminal payoff h satisfy the following conditions:
(A1) f, g ∈ Lb,
(A2) f, g are (Ft)-adapted regular processes,
(A3) ft ≥ gt for all t ∈ [0, T ] P-a.s.,
(A4) the random variable h is FT -adapted and satisfies the order condition
gT ≤ h ≤ fT , P-a.s..
In the context of zero-sum games that we will address below, our assumptions (A3) and (A4) corre-
spond to the so-called war-of-attrition, i.e., games in which both players have an incentive to wait for the
opponent to end the game.
Assumption (A1) is natural in the framework of optimal stopping problems (see, e.g., [34, Section 2.2],
[24, Eq. (D.29)]) and Dynkin games ([45]). By (A2) we replace semimartingale assumptions on f and g
from [45] while imposing certain continuity conditions dating back to [32] in the optimal stopping frame-
work. Regular processes encompass a large family of stochastic processes encountered in applications. It
is straighforward to see that quasi-left continuous processes [37, Section III.11] are regular. In the Mar-
kovian framework all standard processes [7, Def. I.9.2] and, in particular, weak Feller processes ([37,
Def. III.6.5 and Thm. III.11.1] or [7, Thm. I.9.4]) are regular. Hence, strong and weak solutions to sto-
chastic differential equations (SDEs) driven by multi-dimensional Brownian motion (or Lèvy process and
bounded coefficients) [1, Section 6.7] and solutions to jump-diffusion SDEs are also regular processes.
We subsequently relax assumption (A2) by allowing also predictable jumps of the payoff processes. In
particular, in (A2’) we allow predictable jumps of f in any direction and predictable upward jumps of g.
This ensures a certain closedness property (see Section 5.4). Incidentally, such direction of jumps is also
sufficient condition for the existence of optimal (pure) stopping times for each of the players, given a fixed
strategy of the other player (c.f., [19, Theorem 2.41]).
(A2’) Functions f and g have the following decomposition f = f˜ + fˆ , g = g˜ + gˆ with
(1) f˜ , g˜ ∈ Lb,
(2) f˜ , g˜ are (Ft)-adapted regular processes,
(3) fˆ , gˆ are (Ft)-adapted (right-continuous) piecewise constant processes of integrable variation
with fˆ0 = gˆ0 = 0, ∆fˆT = fˆT − fˆT− = 0 and ∆gˆT = gT − gT− = 0,
(4) either fˆ is non-increasing or gˆ is non-decreasing.
Notice that there are non-decreasing processes (f+t ), (f
−
t ), (g
+
t ), (g
−
t ) ∈ Lb starting from 0 such that
fˆ = f+ − f− and gˆ = g+ − g− [13, p. 115].
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It is worth emphasising that further relaxation of condition (A2’) is not possible in the generality of our
setting as demonstrated in Remark 5.22 and in Section 6.3. The necessity to restrict predictable jumps
of one of the payoff processes is a new feature introduced by the asymmetry of information. In classical
Dynkin games it is not necessary, see [16, 31, 43].
We further require a technical assumption
(A5) The filtrations (Ft) and (F it ), i = 1, 2, satisfy the usual conditions, i.e., they are right-continuous
and F i0, i = 1, 2, contain all sets of P-measure zero.
Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff
(2) N(τ, σ) = E
[P(τ, σ)].
The game is said to have a value if
sup
σ
inf
τ
N(τ, σ) = inf
τ
sup
σ
N(τ, σ)
where for now we do not specify the nature of the admissible random times (τ, σ). The mathematical
difficulty with establishing existence of a value lies with the possibility to swap the order of ‘inf’ and
‘sup’ and this is closely linked to the choice of admissible random times.
Remark 2.1. We notice that, by (1), if the players stop simultaneously they exchange the larger payoff
f . This choice is with no loss of generality, since we do not make assumptions on the sign of f , g, h.
Indeed, if a value exists for the game with payoff P(τ, σ), the same is true for the game with payoff
P ′(τ, σ) = −P(τ, σ). However, in the latter game the τ -player is a maximiser and the σ-player is a
minimiser, by the simple fact
sup
σ
inf
τ
P(τ, σ) = − inf
σ
sup
τ
P ′(τ, σ),
and obviously in P ′ we have f ′t = −ft ≤ −gt = g′t. So, in this case, if the players stop simultaneously
they exchange the smaller payoff f ′.
It has been indicated in the literature that games with asymmetric information may not have a value
if players’ strategies are stopping times for their respective filtrations, see [22, Section 2.1]. Indeed, in
Section 6 we demonstrate that the game studied in this paper may not, in general, have a value if the
first player (resp. ther second player) uses (F1t )-stopping times (resp. (F2t )-stopping times). It has been
proven in certain Markovian set-ups that relaxation of player controls to randomised stopping times may
be sufficient for the existence of the value (see, e.g., [22], [21]). The goal of this paper is to show that this
is indeed true in the generality of our non-Markovian set-up for the game with payoff (2).
The framework of this paper encompasses all two-player zero-sum Dynkin games in continuous time
that we found in the literature. Indeed, when (Ft) = (F1t ) = (F2t ), the game (2) is the classical Dynkin
game with full information for both players. The case of (F1t ) = (F2t ) but (F1t ) 6= (Ft) corresponds to a
game with partial but symmetric information about the payoff processes (e.g., [10]), whereas (F1t ) 6= (F2t )
is the game with asymmetric information. One can have (F1t ) = (Ft), i.e., only the second player is
uninformed (e.g., [22]), or (F1t ) 6= (Ft) and (F2t ) 6= (Ft), i.e., both players access different information
flows and neither of them has full knowledge of the underlying world (e.g., [21]). In Section 3, we present
in full detail how games studied in the literature fit into our framework.
As mentioned above the concept of randomised stopping time is central in our work, so we introduce it
here. For that we need to consider increasing processes: given a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft) let
A◦(Gt) := {ρ : ρ is (Gt)-adapted with t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg,
non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω}.
In the definition ofA◦(Gt) we take the opportunity to require that the stated properties hold for all ω ∈ Ω.
This leads to no loss of generality if G0 contains all P-null sets of Ω. Hence for any ω ∈ N ⊂ Ω with
P(N) = 0 we can simply set ρt(ω) = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ) and ρT (ω) = 1. Recall that in the infinite-time
horizon case, T =∞, we understand ρT as an F∞-measurable random variable while ρT− := limt→∞ ρt
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(which exists by the assumption that (ρt) is a càdlàg process). Randomised stopping times can be defined
as follows.
Definition 2.2. Given a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), a random variable η is called a (Gt)-randomised stopping
time if there exists a random variable Z with uniform distribution U([0, 1]), independent of FT , and a
process ρ ∈ A◦(Gt) such that
(3) η = η(ρ, Z) = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : ρt > Z}, P-a.s.
The variable Z is called a randomisation device for the randomised stopping time η, and the process ρ
is called the generating process. The set of (Gt)-randomised stopping times is denoted by T R(Gt). It is
assumed that randomisation devices of different stopping times are independent.
We refer to [41], [45] for an extensive discussion on various definitions of randomised stopping times
and conditions that are necessary for their equivalence. To avoid unnecessary complication of notation,
we assume that the probability space (Ω,F ,P) supports two independent random variables Zτ and Zσ
which are also independent of FT and are the randomisation devices for the randomised stopping times τ
and σ of the two players.
Definition 2.3. Define
V∗ := sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
N(τ, σ) and V ∗ := inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
N(τ, σ).
The lower value and upper value of the game in randomised strategies are given by V∗ and V ∗, respectively.
If they coincide, the game is said to have a value in randomised strategies V = V∗ = V ∗.
The following theorem states the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.4. Under assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5), the game has a value in randomised strategies.
For the clarity of presentation of our methodology, we first prove a theorem with more restrictive
regularity properties of payoff processes and then show how to extend the proof to the general case of
Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 2.5. Under assumptions (A1)-(A5), the game has a value in randomised strategies.
The proofs of the above theorems are given at the end of Section 5. They rely on two key results:
an approximation procedure (Propositions 5.5 and 5.19) and an auxiliary game with ‘nice’ regularity
properties (Theorem 5.4 and 5.18) which enables the use of a known min-max theorem (Theorem 5.1).
The sigma-algebra F0 is not assumed to be trivial. It is therefore natural to consider a game in which
players assess their strategies ex-post, i.e., after the observation available to them at time 0 when their first
action may take place. Allowing for more generality, let G be a sigma-algebra contained in F10 and in F20 ,
i.e., containing information available to both players at time 0. The expected payoff of the game in this
case takes the form:
(4) E
[
P (τ, σ)
∣∣G] = E[fτI{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + gσI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + hI{σ=T}∩{τ=T}∣∣G].
The proof of the following theorem is in Section 5.5.
Theorem 2.6. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2.4 and for any G ⊆ F10 ∩F20 , the G-conditioned game
has a value, i.e.
(5) ess sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
ess inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
E
[
P (τ, σ)
∣∣G] = ess inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
ess sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
E
[
P (τ, σ)
∣∣G].
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3. EXAMPLES
Before moving on to prove the theorems stated above, in this section we illustrate some of the specific
games for which our general results apply. We draw form the existing literature on two-player zero-sum
Dynkin games in continuous time and show that a broad class of these (all those we are aware of) fits
within our framework. Since our contribution is mainly to the theory of games with partial/asymmetric
information, we exclude the well-known case of games with full information which has been extensively
studied (see our literature review in the introduction).
3.1. GAME WITH PARTIALLY OBSERVED SCENARIOS
Our first example extends the setting in [22] and it reduces to that case if J = 1 and the payoff processes
f , g and h are deterministic functions of a Itô diffusion (Xt) on Rd, i.e., ft = f(t,Xt), gt = g(t,Xt) and
h = h(XT ). On a discrete probability space (Ωs,Fs,Ps), consider two random variables I and J taking
values in {1, . . . , I} and in {1, . . . , J}, respectively. Denote their joint distribution by (pii,j)i=1,...,I,j=1,...,J
so that pii,j = Ps(I = i,J = j). The indices (i, j) are used to identify the scenario in which the game
is played and are the key ingredient to model the asymmetric information feature. Consider another
probability space (Ωp,Fp,Pp) with a filtration (Fpt ) satisfying the usual conditions, and (Fpt )-adapted
payoff processes f i,j and gi,j , and a FT -measurable terminal payoffs hi,j , with (i, j) taking values in
{1, . . . , I} × {1, . . . , J}. For all i, j, we assume that f i,j , gi,j , hi,j satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4).
The game is set on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) := (Ωp×Ωs,Fp ∨Fs,Pp⊗Ps). The first player is
informed about the outcome of I before the game starts but never directly observes J . Hence, her actions
are adapted to the filtration F1t = Fpt ∨ σ(I). Conversely, the second player knows J but not I, so her
actions are adapted to the filtration F2t = Fpt ∨ σ(J ). Given a choice of random times τ, σ for the first
and the second player the payoff is
P(τ, σ) = fI,Jτ I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + gI,Jσ I{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + hI,J I{σ=T}∩{τ=T}.
Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (2). It is worth noticing that this corre-
sponds to the so-called ‘ex-ante’ expected payoff, i.e., the expected payoff before the players acquire the
additional information about the values of I and J . The structure of the game is common knowledge,
i.e., both players know all processes f i,j , gi,j and all random variables hi,j involved; however, they have
partial and asymmetric knowledge on the couple (i, j) which is drawn at the start of the game from the
distribution of (I,J ).
Drawing a precise parallel with the framework of Section 2, the above setting corresponds to ft = f
I,J
t ,
gt = g
I,J
t , and h = h
I,J with the filtration Ft = Fpt ∨ σ(I,J ). The observation flows for the players
are given by (F1t ) and (F2t ), respectively.
The particular structure of players’ filtrations (F1t ) and (F2t ) allows for the following decomposition
of randomised stopping times, see [20, Proposition 3.3] (recall the radomisation devices Zτ ∼ U([0, 1])
and Zσ ∼ U([0, 1]), which are mutually independent and independent of FT ).
Lemma 3.1. Any τ ∈ T R(F1t ) has a representation
(6) τ =
I∑
i=1
I{I=i}τi,
where τ1, . . . , τI ∈ T R(Fpt ), with generating processes ξ1, . . . , ξI ∈ A◦(Fpt ) and a common randomisa-
tion deviceZτ . An analogous representation holds for σ with σ1, . . . , σJ ∈ T R(Fpt ), generating processes
ζ1t , . . . , ζ
J
t ∈ A◦(Fpt ), and a common randomisation device Zσ.
Corollary 3.2. Any (F1t )-stopping time τ has a decomposition (6) with τ1, . . . , τI being (Fpt )-stopping
times (and analogously for (F2t )-stopping times).
Hence, given a realisation of the idiosyncratic scenario variable I (resp. J ), the first (second) player
chooses a randomised stopping time whose generating process is adapted to the common filtration (Fpt ).
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The resulting expected payoff can be written as
N(τ, σ) =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
pii,jE
[
f i,jτi I{τi≤σj}∩{τi<T} + g
i,j
σj I{σj<τi} + h
i,jI{σj=T}∩{τi=T}
]
.
3.2. GAME WITH A SINGLE PARTIALLY OBSERVED DYNAMICS
Our second example generalises the set-ups of [10] and [11] and reduces to those cases when J = 2,
the time horizon is infinite and the payoff processes are (particular) time-homogeneous functions of a (par-
ticular) one-dimensional diffusion. Here the underlying dynamics of the game is a diffusion, whose drift
depends on the realisation of an independent multinomial random variable J ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Formally, on
a probability space (Ω,F ,P) we have a Brownian motion (Wt) on Rd, an independent random variable
J ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} with distribution pij = P(J = j), and a process (Xt) on Rd with the dynamics
dXt =
J∑
j=1
I{J=j}µj(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x,
where σ, (µj)j=1,...J are given functions (known to both players) that guarantee existence of a unique
strong solution of the SDE. The payoff processes are deterministic functions of the underlying process,
i.e., ft = f(t,Xt), gt = g(t,Xt) and h = h(XT ), and they are known to both players. We assume that the
payoff processes satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4). It is worth to remark that in the specific setting of [10] the
norms ‖f‖Lb and ‖g‖Lb are not finite so that our results cannot be directly applied. However, the overall
structure of the game in [10] is easier than ours so that some other special features of the payoff process
can be used to determine existence of the value therein.
To draw a precise parallel with the notation from Section 2, here we take Ft = FWt ∨ σ(J ) where
(FWt ) is the filtration generated by the Brownian sample paths and augmented with P-null sets. Both
players observe the dynamics of X , however they have partial/asymmetric information on the value of J .
In [10] neither of the two players knows the true value of J , so we have (F1t ) = (F2t ) = (FXt ), where
(FXt ) is generated by the sample paths of the process X and it is augmented by the P-null sets (notice
that FXt ( Ft). In [11] instead, the first player (minimiser) observes the true value of J . In that case
(F1t ) = (Ft) and (F2t ) = (FXt ), so that F2t ( F1t . Using the notation XJ to emphasise the dependence
of the underlying dynamics on J , and given a choice of random times τ and σ for the first and the second
player, the game’s payoff reads
P(τ, σ) = f(τ,XJτ )I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + g(σ,XJσ )I{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + h(XJT )I{σ=T}∩{τ=T}.
Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (2). Finally, we remark that under a number
of (restrictive) technical assumptions and with infinite horizon [10] and [11] show the existence of a value
(actually of a saddle point) in a smaller class of strategies. In [10] both players use (FXt )-stopping times,
with no need for additional randomisation. In [11] the uninformed player uses (FXt )-stopping times but
the informed player uses (Ft)-randomised stopping times.
3.3. GAME WITH TWO PARTIALLY OBSERVED DYNAMICS
Here we show how the setting of [21] also fits in our framework. This example is conceptually different
from the previous two because the players observes two different stochastic processes. On a probability
space (Ω,F ,P) two standard Markov processes are defined (Xt) and (Yt) (in [21] these are finite-state
Markov chains in continuous time). The first player only observes the process (Xt) while the second
player only observes the process (Yt). In the notation of Section 2, we have (F1t ) = (FXt ), (F2t ) = (FYt )
and (Ft) = (FXt ∨ FYt ), where the filtration (FXt ) is generated by the sample paths of (Xt) and (FYt )
by those of (Yt) (both filtrations are augmented with P-null sets). The payoff processes are deterministic
functions of the underlying dynamics, i.e., ft = f(t,Xt, Yt), gt = g(t,Xt, Yt) and h = h(XT , YT ) and
they satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4). Given a choice of random times τ ∈ T R(F1t ) and σ ∈ T R(F2t ) for the
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first and the second player, the game’s payoff reads
P(τ, σ) = f(τ,Xτ , Yτ )I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + g(σ,Xσ, Yσ)I{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + h(XT , , YT )I{σ=T}∩{τ=T}.
Players assess the game by looking at the expected payoff as in (2). We remark that the proof of existence
of the value in [21] is based on variational inequalities and relies on the finiteness of the state spaces of
both underlying processes, and therefore cannot be extended to our general non-Markovian framework.
However, in their setting the authors of [21] also obtain optimal strategies for both players.
3.4. GAME WITH A RANDOM HORIZON
Here we consider a non-Markovian extension of the the framework of [30], where the time horizon of
the game is exponentially distributed and independent of the payoff processes. On a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) we have a filtration (Gt)t∈[0,T ], augmented with P-null sets, and a positive random variable θ
which is independent of GT . Let Λt := I{t≥θ} and, in analogy with Section 2, we takeFt = Gt∨σ(Λs, 0 ≤
s ≤ t).
In order to define the payoff processes we start with (Gt)-adapted processes f0, g0 and an GT -measurable
terminal payoff h0 that satisfy conditions (A1)-(A4), and then set
ft := f
0
t I{t<θ}, gt := g
0
t I{t<θ} and h := h
0I{T<θ}.
We also assume that conditions (A1)-(A4) hold for the processes (ft), (gt) and for h. Condition (A2)
is immediately satisfied if θ has a continuous distribution, as in [30], because θ is a totally inaccessible
stopping time for the filtration (Ft), by [37, Example VI.14.4].
The players have asymmetric knowledge of the random variable θ. The first player observes the occur-
rence of θ, whereas the second player does not. We have (F1t ) = (Ft) and (F2t ) = (Gt) ( (F1t ). Given
a choice of random times τ ∈ T R(F1t ) and σ ∈ T R(F2t ) for the first and the second player, the game’s
payoff reads
P(τ, σ) = fτI{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + gσI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + hI{σ=T}∩{τ=T}
= I{τ∧σ<θ}
(
f0τ I{τ≤σ}∩{τ<T} + g
0
σI{σ<τ}∩{σ<T} + h
0I{σ=T}∩{τ=T}
)
.
It is worth noticing that in [30] the setting is Markovian with T =∞, f0t = e−rtf(Xt), g0t = e−rtg(Xt)
(f , g deterministic functions and r ≥ 0), h0 = 0, θ is exponentially distributed and (Xt) a one-
dimensional linear diffusion. Under specific technical requirements on the functions f and g the authors
indeed find that a Nash equilibrium for the game exists when the first player uses (F1t )-stopping times
and the second player uses (F2t )-stopping times, with no need for randomisation. Their methods rely on
the theory of one dimensional linear diffusions (i.e., using scale function and speed measure) and free
boundary problems, hence do not admit an extension to a non-Markovian case.
4. REFORMULATION AS A GAME OF (SINGULAR) CONTROLS
In order to integrate out the randomisation devices for τ and σ and obtain a reformulation of the payoff
functional N(τ, σ) in terms of generating processes for randomised stopping times τ and σ, we need the
following two auxiliary lemmata. We remark that if η is an (Gt)-randomised stopping time for (Gt) ⊆
(Ft), then η is also an (Ft)-randomised stopping time. Therefore, the results below are formulated for
(Ft)-randomises stopping times.
Lemma 4.1. Let η be an (Ft)-randomised stopping time with the generating process (ρt). Then, for any
FT -measurable random variable κ with values in [0, T ],
E[I{η≤κ}|FT ] = ρκ, E[I{η>κ}|FT ] = 1− ρκ,(7)
E[I{η<κ}|FT ] = ρκ− , E[I{η≥κ}|FT ] = 1− ρκ− .(8)
Proof. The proof of (7) follows the lines of [11, Proposition 3.1]. Let Z be the randomisation device for
η. Since ρ is right-continuous, non-decreasing and (3) holds, we have
{ρκ > Z} ⊆ {η ≤ κ} ⊆ {ρκ ≥ Z}.
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Using that ρκ is FT -measurable, and Z is uniformly distributed and independent of FT , we compute
E[I{η≤κ}|FT ] ≥ E[I{ρκ>Z}|FT ] =
∫ 1
0
I{ρκ>y}dy = ρκ,
and
E[I{η≤κ}|FT ] ≤ E[I{ρκ≥Z}|FT ] =
∫ 1
0
I{ρκ≥y}dy = ρκ.
This completes the proof of the first equality in (7). The other one is a direct consequence.
To prove (8), we observe that, by (7), for any ε > 0 we have
I{κ>0}E[I{η≤(κ−ε)∨(κ/2)}|FT ] = I{κ>0}ρ(κ−ε)∨(κ/2).
Dominated convergence theorem implies
E[I{η<κ}|FT ] = I{κ>0} E[I{η<κ}|FT ] = lim
ε↓0
I{κ>0} E[I{η≤(κ−ε)∨(κ/2)}|FT ]
= lim
ε↓0
I{κ>0} ρ(κ−ε)∨(κ/2) = I{κ>0} ρκ− = ρκ−,
This proves the first equality in (8). The other one is a direct consequence. 
Lemma 4.2. Let η, θ ∈ T R(Ft) with generating processes (ρt), (χt) and independent randomisation
devices Zη, Zθ. For X ∈ Lb, we have
E
[
XηI{η≤θ}∩{η<T}
]
= E
[∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt−)dρt
]
,
E
[
XηI{η<θ}
]
= E
[∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt)dρt
]
,
where we use the notation
∫
[0,T ) for the (pathwise) Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral.
Proof. For y ∈ [0, 1), define a family of random variables
q(y) = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : ρt > y}.
Then, η = q(Zη). Using that Zη ∼ U(0, 1) and Fubini’s theorem, we see that
E
[
XηI{η≤θ}∩{η<T}
]
= E
[∫ 1
0
Xq(y)I{q(y)≤θ}∩{q(y)<T}dy
]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
E
[
Xq(y)I{q(y)≤θ}∩{q(y)<T}|FT
]]
dy.
Since Xq(y)I{q(y)<T} is FT -measurable and the randomization device Zθ is independent of FT , we con-
tinue as follows:∫ 1
0
E
[
E
[
Xq(y)I{q(y)≤θ}∩{q(y)<T}|FT
]]
dy =
∫ 1
0
E
[
Xq(y)I{q(y)<T}E[I{q(y)≤θ}|FT ]
]
dy
= E
[∫ 1
0
Xq(y)I{q(y)<T}(1− χq(y)−)dy
]
= E
[∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt−)dρt
]
,
where in the second equality we apply Lemma 4.1 with κ = q(y) and in the third equality we change
the variable of integration applying [35, Proposition 0.4.9] ω-wise and using the fact that the function
y 7→ q(y)(ω) is the generalized inverse of t 7→ ρt(ω). The first statement of the lemma is now proved.
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For the second statement, we adapt the arguments above to write
E
[
XηI{η<θ}
]
=
∫ 1
0
E
[
Xq(y)E[I{q(y)<θ}|FT ]
]
dy = E
[∫ 1
0
Xq(y)(1− χq(y))dy
]
= E
[∫
[0,T ]
Xt(1− χt)dρt
]
= E
[∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt)dρt
]
,
where in the last equality we used that χT = 1. 
Applying Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 to (1) and (2) and noticing that
E[I{η=κ}|FT ] = E[I{η≤κ} − I{η<κ}|FT ] = ρκ − ρκ−
we obtain the following reformulation of the game.
Proposition 4.3. For τ ∈ T R(F1t ), σ ∈ T R(F2t ),
(9) N(τ, σ) = E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
,
where (ξt) and (ζt) are the generating processes for τ and σ, respectively, and ∆ξT = ξT−ξT− = 1−ξT−
denotes the jump of ξ at T , and ∆ζT = 1− ζT−.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will denote the right-hand side of (9) by N(ξ, ζ).
Remark 4.4. In the Definition 2.3 of the lower value, the infimum can always be replaced by infimum
over pure stopping times (cf. [29]). Same holds for the supremum in the definition of the upper value.
Let us look at the upper value: take arbitrary τ ∈ T R(F1t ), σ ∈ T R(F2t ), and define the family of
stopping times
q(y) = inf{t ∈ [0, T ] : ζt > y}, y ∈ [0, 1),
similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.2 and with (ζt) the generating process of σ. Then,
N(τ, σ) =
∫ 1
0
N(τ, q(y))dy ≤ sup
y∈[0,1)
N(τ, q(y)) ≤ sup
σ∈T (F2t )
N(τ, σ),
where T (F2t ) denotes the set of pure (F2t )-stopping times. Since T (F2t ) ⊂ T R(F2t ), we have
sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
N(τ, σ) = sup
σ∈T (F2t )
N(τ, σ),
and, consequently, the ‘inner’ optimisation can be done over pure stopping times:
inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
N(τ, σ) = inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
sup
σ∈T (F2t )
N(τ, σ).
By the same argument one can show that
sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
N(τ, σ) = sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
inf
τ∈T (F1t )
N(τ, σ).
However, in general an analogue result for the ‘outer’ optimisation does not hold, i.e.,
sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
N(τ, σ) 6= sup
σ∈T (F2t )
inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
N(τ, σ)
as shown by an example in Section 6.
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5. SION’S THEOREM AND EXISTENCE OF VALUE
The proofs of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5, i.e., that the game with payoff (2) has a value in randomised
strategies, utilises Sion’s min-max theorem [40] (see also [27] for a simple proof). The idea of relying on
Sion’s theorem comes from [45] where the authors study zero-sum Dynkin games with full and symmetric
information. Here, however, we need different key technical arguments as explained in, e.g., Remark 5.16
below.
Let us start by recalling Sion’s theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Sion’s theorem). [40, Corollary 3.3] LetA andB be convex subsets of a linear topological
space one of which is compact. Let ϕ(µ, ν) be a function A × B 7→ R that is quasi-concave and upper
semi-continuous in µ for each ν ∈ B, and quasi-convex and lower semi-continuous in ν for each µ ∈ A.
Then,
sup
µ∈A
inf
ν∈B
ϕ(µ, ν) = inf
ν∈B
sup
µ∈A
ϕ(µ, ν).
The key step in applying Sion’s theorem is to find a topology on the set of randomised stopping times,
or, equivalently, on the set of corresponding generating processes so that the functional N(·, ·) satisfies
the assumptions. We will use the weak topology of
S := L2([0, T ]× Ω,B([0, T ])×F , λ× P),
where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Given a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), in addition to the class
of increasing processes A◦(Gt) introduced in Section 2, here we also need
A◦ac(Gt) := {ρ ∈ A◦(G) : t 7→ ρt(ω) is absolutely continuous on [0, T ) for all ω ∈ Ω}.
It is important to notice that ρ ∈ A◦ac(Gt) may have a jump at time T if
ρT−(ω) := lim
t↑T
∫ t
0
(
d
dtρs
)
(ω)ds < 1 = ρT (ω).
As for A◦(Gt), in the definition of A◦ac(Gt) we require that the stated properties hold for all ω ∈ Ω, which
causes no loss of generality if G0 contains all P-null sets of Ω. It is clear that A◦ac(Gt) ⊂ A◦(Gt) ⊂ S.
For reasons that will become clear later (e.g., see Lemma 5.15), we prefer to work with slightly more
general processes than those in A◦(Gt) and A◦ac(Gt). Let us denote
A(Gt) := {ρ ∈ S : ∃ ρˆ ∈ A◦(Gt) such that ρ = ρˆ for (λ× P)-a.e. (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω},
Aac(Gt) := {ρ ∈ S : ∃ ρˆ ∈ A◦ac(Gt) such that ρ = ρˆ for (λ× P)-a.e. (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω}.
We will call ρˆ in the definition of the set A (and Aac) the càdlàg (and absolutely continuous) representa-
tive of ρ. Although it is not unique, all càdlàg representatives are indistinguishable (Lemma 5.6). Hence,
all càdlàg representatives of ρ ∈ A define the same positive measure t 7→ ρˆt(ω) on [0, T ] for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Then, given any bounded measurable process (Xt) the stochastic process (Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral)
t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs dρˆs, t ∈ [0, T ],
does not depend on the choice of the càdlàg representative ρˆ in the sense that it is defined up to indistin-
guishability.
The next definition connects the randomised stopping times that we use in the construction of the game’s
payoff (Proposition 4.3) with processes from the classes A(F1t ) and A(F2t ). Note that A(Gt) ⊆ A(Ft)
whenever (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), so the definition can be stated for A(Ft) without any loss of generality.
Definition 5.2. For X ∈ Lb and χ, ρ ∈ A(Ft), we define the Lebesgue-Stieltjes integral processes
t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs dρs, t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χs)dρs and t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χs−)dρs t ∈ [0, T ],
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by
t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs dρˆs, t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χˆs)dρˆs and t 7→
∫
[0,t]
Xs (1− χˆs−)dρˆs t ∈ [0, T ],
for any choice of the càdlàg representatives ρˆ and χˆ, uniquely up to indistinguishability.
With a slight abuse of notation we define a functional N : A(F1t ) × A(F2t ) → R by the right-hand
side of (9). It is immediate to verify using Definition 2.3 and Proposition 4.3 that the lower and the upper
value of our game satisfy
V∗ = sup
ζ∈A(F2t )
inf
ξ∈A(F1t )
N(ξ, ζ), V ∗ = inf
ξ∈A(F1t )
sup
ζ∈A(F2t )
N(ξ, ζ).(10)
Notice that even though according to Definition 2.2 the couple (ξ, ζ) should be taken inA◦(F1t )×A◦(F2t ),
in (10) we consider (ξ, ζ) ∈ A(F1t )×A(F2t ). This causes no inconsistency thanks to the discussion above
and Definition 5.2 for integrals.
Remark 5.3. The mapping A(F1t )×A(F2t ) 3 (ξ, ζ) 7→ N(ξ, ζ) does not satisfy the conditions of Sion’s
theorem. Indeed, taking ξnt = I{t≥T/2+1/n}, we have ξnt → I{t≥T/2} =: ξt for λ-a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], so
that by dominated convergence it also converges to ξ in S. Then, fixing ζt = I{t≥T/2} in A(F2t ) we
have N(ξn, ζ) = E[gT/2] for all n ≥ 1 whereas N(ξ, ζ) = E[fT/2]. So the lower semicontinuity of
ξ 7→ N(ξ, ζ) cannot be ensured if, for example, P(fT/2 > gT/2) > 0.
Due to issues indicated in the above remark, as in [45], we ‘smoothen’ the control strategy of one
player in order to introduce additional regularity in the payoff. We will show that this procedure does not
change the value of the game (Proposition 5.5). We choose (arbitrarily and with no loss of generality) to
consider an auxiliary game in which the first player can only use controls from Aac(F1t ). Let us define
the associated upper/lower values:
(11) W∗ = sup
ζ∈A(F2t )
inf
ξ∈Aac(F1t )
N(ξ, ζ) and W ∗ = inf
ξ∈Aac(F1t )
sup
ζ∈A(F2t )
N(ξ, ζ).
Here, we work under the regularity assumption on the payoff processes (A2). Relaxation of this as-
sumption is conducted in Section 5.4. The main results can be distilled into the following theorems:
Theorem 5.4. Under assumptions (A1)-(A5), the game (11) has a value, i.e.
W∗ = W ∗ := W.
Moreover, the ζ-player (maximiser) has an optimal strategy, i.e. there exists ζ∗ ∈ A(F2t ) such that
inf
ξ∈Aac(F1t )
N(ξ, ζ∗) = W.
Proposition 5.5. Under assumptions (A1)-(A5), for any ζ ∈ A(F2t ) and ξ ∈ A(F1t ), there is a sequence
ξn ∈ Aac(F1t ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
N(ξn, ζ) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).
The proofs of the above theorems will be conducted in the following subsections: Section 5.1 contains
a series of technical results which we then use to prove Theorem 5.4 (in Section 5.2) and Proposition
5.5 (in Section 5.3). With the results from Theorem 5.4 and Proposition 5.5 in place we can provide the
(simple) proof of Theorem 2.5.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Obviously, V∗ ≤ W∗ and V ∗ ≤ W ∗. However, Proposition 5.5 implies that
infξ∈Aac(F1t )N(ξ, ζ) ≤ infξ∈A(F1t )N(ξ, ζ) for any ζ ∈ A(F2t ), so V∗ ≥ W∗ and therefore V∗ = W∗.
Then, thanks to Theorem 5.4, we have a sequence of inequalities which complete the proof
W = W∗ = V∗ ≤ V ∗ ≤W ∗ = W.

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5.1. TECHNICAL RESULTS
In this section we give a series of results concerning the convergence of integrals when either the
integrand or the integrator converge in a suitable sense. We start with stating a technical lemma whose
easy proof is omitted.
Lemma 5.6. Let (Xt) and (Yt) be càdlàg measurable processes such that Xt = Yt, P-a.s. for t ∈ D ⊂
[0, T ) countable and dense, X0− = Y0− and XT = YT , P-a.s. Then (Xt) is indistinguishable from (Yt).
Definition 5.7. Given a càdlàg measurable process (Xt), for each ω ∈ Ω we denote
CX(ω) := {t ∈ [0, T ] : Xt−(ω) = Xt(ω)}.
Our next result tells us that convergence (λ × P)-a.e. of processes in A(Gt) can be lifted to P-a.s.
convergence at all points continuity of the corresponding càdlàg representatives.
Lemma 5.8. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A(Gt) and ρ ∈ A(Gt) with ρn → ρ (λ× P)-a.e.
as n→∞. Then for any càdlàg representatives ρˆn and ρˆ we have
(12) P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ ρˆ
n
t (ω) = ρˆt(ω) for all t ∈ Cρˆ(ω)
})
= 1.
Proof. The (λ × P)-a.e. convergence of ρn to ρ means that the càdlàg representatives ρˆn converge to ρˆ
also (λ × P)-a.e.. Hence, there is a set D ⊂ [0, T ] with λ([0, T ] \ D) = 0 such that ρˆnt → ρˆt P-a.s. for
t ∈ D. Since λ([0, T ] \D) = 0, there is a countable subset D0 ⊂ D that is dense in [0, T ]. Define
Ω0 := {ω ∈ Ω : ρˆnt (ω)→ ρˆt(ω) for all t ∈ D0}.
Then P(Ω0) = 1.
Now, fix ω ∈ Ω0 and let t ∈ Cρˆ(ω) ∩ (0, T ). Take an increasing sequence (t1k)k≥1 ⊂ D0 and a
decreasing one (t2k)k≥1 ⊂ D0, both converging to t as k →∞. For each k ≥ 1 we have
(13) ρˆt(ω) = lim
k→∞
ρˆt2k
(ω) = lim
k→∞
lim
n→∞ ρˆ
n
t2k
(ω) ≥ lim sup
n→∞
ρˆnt (ω),
where in the final inequality we use that ρˆn
t2k
(ω) ≥ ρˆnt (ω) by monotonicity. By analogous arguments we
also obtain
ρˆt(ω) = lim
k→∞
ρˆt1k
(ω) = lim
k→∞
lim
n→∞ ρˆ
n
t1k
(ω) ≤ lim inf
n→∞
ρˆnt (ω),
where the first equality holds because t ∈ Cρˆ(ω). Combining the above we get (12) (apart from t ∈
{0, T}) by recalling that ω ∈ Ω0 and P(Ω0) = 1. The convergence at t = T , irrespective of whether it
belongs to Cρˆ(ω), is trivial as ρˆnT (ω) = ρˆT (ω) = 1. If 0 ∈ Cρˆ(ω), then ρˆ0(ω) = ρˆ0−(ω) = 0. Inequality
(13) reads 0 = ρˆ0(ω) ≥ lim supn→∞ ρˆn0 (ω). Since ρˆn0 (ω) ≥ 0, this proves that ρˆn0 (ω)→ ρˆ0(ω) = 0. 
Lemma 5.9. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A◦(Gt) and ρ ∈ A◦(Gt) with ρn → ρ (λ×P)-a.e.
as n→∞. For any t ∈ [0, T ] and any random variable X ≥ 0 with E[X] <∞, we have
lim sup
n→∞
E[X∆ρnt ] ≤ E[X∆ρt].
Proof. Fix t ∈ (0, T ). Arguing by contradiction, assume there exists a subsequence nk such that
lim
k→∞
E[X∆ρnkt ] > E[X∆ρt].
Therefore, using (λ× P)-a.e. convergence of ρn to ρ, i.e., that ∫ T0 P( limk→∞ ρnkt = ρt)dt = T , there is
a decreasing sequence δm → 0 such that
lim
k→∞
ρnkt−δm = ρt−δm , limk→∞
ρnkt+δm = ρt+δm , P-a.s.
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Then, by the dominated convergence theorem,
E[X∆ρt] = lim
m→∞E[X(ρt+δm − ρt−δm)]
= lim
m→∞ limk→∞
E[X(ρnkt+δm − ρ
nk
t−δm)]
= lim
m→∞ lim supk→∞
E[X(ρnkt+δm − ρ
nk
t−δm)]
= lim
m→∞ lim supk→∞
E[X(ρnkt+δm − ρ
nk
t + ρ
nk
t− − ρnkt−δm + ∆ρ
nk
t )] ≥ lim sup
k→∞
E[X∆ρnkt ],
where the last inequality is due to t 7→ ρnkt being non-decreasing. This contradiction finishes the proof for
t ∈ (0, T ). The proof for t ∈ {0, T} is a simplified version of the argument above, since ρnT = ρT = 1
and ρn0− = ρ0− = 0, P-a.s. 
We need to consider a slightly larger class of processes A˜◦(Gt) ⊃ A◦(Gt) defined by
A˜◦(Gt) := {ρ : ρ is (Gt)-adapted with t 7→ ρt(ω) càdlàg,
non-decreasing, ρ0−(ω) = 0 and ρT (ω) ≤ 1 for all ω ∈ Ω}.
Proposition 5.10. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A˜◦(Gt) and ρ ∈ A˜◦(Gt). Assume
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t (ω) = ρt(ω) for all t ∈ Cρ(ω) ∪ {T}
})
= 1.
Then for any X ∈ Lb that is also (Ft)-adapted and regular, we have
(14) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xtdρ
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xtdρt
]
.
Proof. Let us first assume that (Xt) ∈ Lb has continuous trajectories (but is not necessarily adapted). If
we prove that
(15) lim
n→∞
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)dρ
n
t (ω) =
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)dρt(ω), for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω,
then the result in (14) will follow by the dominated convergence theorem. By assumption there is Ω0 ⊂ Ω
with P(Ω0) = 1 and such that ρnt (ω)→ ρt(ω) at all points of continuity of t 7→ ρt(ω) and at the terminal
time T for all ω ∈ Ω0. Since dρnt (ω) and dρt(ω) define positive measures on [0, T ] for each ω ∈ Ω0, the
convergence of integrals in (15) can be deduced from the weak convergence of finite measures, see [39,
Remark III.1.2]. Indeed, if ω ∈ Ω0 is such that ρT (ω) = 0, the right-hand side of (15) is zero and we have
lim sup
n→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)dρ
n
t (ω)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ lim supn→∞ supt∈[0,T ] |Xt(ω)|ρnT (ω) = 0,
where we use X ∈ Lb to ensure that supt∈[0,T ] |Xt(ω)| < ∞. If instead, ω ∈ Ω0 is such that ρT (ω) >
0, then for all sufficiently large n’s, we have ρnT (ω) > 0 and t 7→ ρnt (ω)/ρnT (ω) define cumulative
distribution functions (cdfs) converging pointwise to ρt(ω)/ρT (ω) at the points of continuity of ρt(ω).
Since t 7→ Xt(ω) is continuous, [39, Thm III.1.1] justifies
lim
n→∞
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)dρ
n
t (ω) = limn→∞ ρ
n
T (ω)
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)d
(
ρnt (ω)
ρnT (ω)
)
= ρT (ω)
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)d
(
ρt(ω)
ρT (ω)
)
=
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(ω)dρt(ω).
Now we drop the continuity assumption on X . We turn our attention to càdlàg, (Ft)-adapted and
regular (Xt) ∈ Lb. By [6, Theorem 3] there is X˜ ∈ Lb with continuous trajectories (not necessarily
adapted) such that (Xt) is an (Ft)-optional projection of (X˜t). From the first part of the proof we know
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that (14) holds for (X˜t). To show that it holds for (Xt) it is sufficient to notice that (ρnt ) and (ρt) are
(Ft)-optional processes, and apply [13, Thm VI.57] to obtain
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xtdρ
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
X˜tdρ
n
t
]
and E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xtdρt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
X˜tdρt
]
.

Remark 5.11. The statement of Proposition 5.10 can be strengthened to include all processes in Lb which
are regular but not necessarily (Ft)-adapted. One can prove it by adapting arguments of the proof of [32,
Thm. 3].
Proposition 5.12. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let χ ∈ A◦(Gt) and ρ ∈ Aac(Gt) and consider X ∈ Lb
which is (Ft)-adapted and regular. If (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ Aac(Gt) converges (λ× P)-a.e. to ρ as n→∞, then
(16) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xt(1− χt−)dρnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xt(1− χt−)dρt
]
.
Proof. Define absolutely continuous adapted processes
Rnt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− χs−)dρns and Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− χs−)dρs,
so that
(17)
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(1− χt−)dρnt =
∫
[0,T ]
XtdR
n
t and
∫
[0,T ]
Xt(1− χt−)dρt =
∫
[0,T ]
XtdRt.
With no loss of generality we can consider the absolutely continuous representatives of ρ and ρn from the
classA◦ac(Gt) in the definition of all the integrals above (which we still denote by ρ and ρn for simplicity).
In light of this observation it is clear that (Rn)n≥1 ⊂ A˜◦(Gt) and R ∈ A˜◦(Gt). The idea is then to apply
Proposition 5.10 to the integrals with Rn and R in (17).
Thanks to Lemma 5.8 and recalling that ρnT = ρT = 1, the set
Ω0 =
{
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t (ω) = ρt(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ]
}
has full measure, i.e., P(Ω0) = 1. For any ω ∈ Ω0 and t ∈ [0, T ], integrating by parts (see, e.g., [35, Prop.
4.5, Chapter 0]), using dominated convergence theorem and then again integrating by parts give
(18) lim
n→∞R
n
t = limn→∞
[
(1− χt)ρnt −
∫
[0,t]
ρns d(1− χs)
]
= (1− χt)ρt −
∫
[0,t]
ρsd(1− χs) = Rt.
Hence Rn and R satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 5.10 and we can conclude that (16) holds. 
We close this technical section with a similar result to the above but for approximations of processes in
A(F1t ), which is needed for the proof of Proposition 5.5. The next proposition is tailored for our specific
type of regularisation of processes in A(F1t ). Notice that the left hand side of (20) features χt− while the
right hand side has χt.
Proposition 5.13. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), let χ, ρ ∈ A◦(Gt), (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A◦(Gt) and consider
X ∈ Lb which is (Ft)-adapted and regular. Assume the sequence (ρn)n≥1 is non-decreasing and for
P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t (ω) = ρt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ).(19)
Then
(20) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt−)dρnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
Xt(1− χt)dρt
]
and for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
(21) lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t−(ω) = ρt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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Proof. Denote by Ω0 the set on which the convergence (19) holds. The first observation, is that for all
ω ∈ Ω0 and t ∈ (0, T ]
lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t−(ω) = limn→∞ limu↑t
ρnu(ω) = lim
u↑t
lim
n→∞ ρ
n
u(ω) = lim
u↑t
ρu−(ω) = ρt−(ω),(22)
where the order of limits can be swapped by monotonicity of the process and of the sequence. The
convergence at t = 0 is obvious as ρn0− = ρ0− = 0. This proves (21).
Define for t ∈ [0, T ),
(23) Rnt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− χs−)dρns , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− χs)dρs,
and extend both processes to t = T in a continuous way by taking RnT := R
n
T− and RT := RT−. By
construction we have (Rn)n≥1 ⊂ A˜◦(Gt) and R ∈ A˜◦(Gt) and the idea is to apply Proposition 5.10. First
we notice that for all ω ∈ Ω and any t ∈ [0, T ) we have
∆Rt(ω) = (1− χt(ω))∆ρt(ω)
so that we can write the set of points of continuity of R as (recall Definition 5.7)
CR(ω) = Cρ(ω) ∪ {t ∈ [0, T ] : χt(ω) = 1}.
For any t ∈ [0, T ) and all ω ∈ Ω0, integrating by parts Rnt (ω) ([35, Prop. 4.5, Chapter 0]) and then
taking limits as n→∞ we get
lim
n→∞R
n
t (ω) = limn→∞
[
(1− χt(ω))ρnt (ω)−
∫
[0,t]
ρns (ω)d(1− χs(ω))
]
(24)
= (1− χt(ω))ρt−(ω)−
∫
[0,t]
ρs−(ω)d(1− χs(ω))
=Rt(ω)− (1− χt(ω))∆ρt(ω) = Rt−(ω),
where the second equality uses dominated convergence and (19), and the third equality is integration by
parts. We can therefore conclude that
lim
n→∞R
n
t (ω) = Rt(ω), for all t ∈ CR(ω) ∩ [0, T ) and all ω ∈ Ω0.
It remains to show the convergence at T which is inCR(ω) by our construction ofR. Since the function
t 7→ ρt(ω) is non-decreasing and the sequence (ρn(ω))n is non-decreasing, the sequence (Rn(ω))n is non-
decreasing too (an easy proof of this fact involves integration by parts and observing that t 7→ d(1−χt(ω))
defines a negative measure; notice also the link to the first-order stochastic dominance). As in (22),
we show that limn→∞RnT−(ω) = RT−(ω) for ω ∈ Ω0. By construction of Rn and R, this proves
convergence of RnT to RT .
Then, the processes Rn and R fulfil all the assumptions of Proposition 5.10 whose application allows
us to obtain (20). 
From the convergence (24), an identical argument as in (22) proves convergence of left-limits of pro-
cesses (Rn) at any t ∈ [0, T ]. The following corollary formalises this observation. It will be used in
Section 5.4.
Corollary 5.14. Consider the processes (Rn) and R defined in (23). For P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω we have
lim
n→∞R
n
t−(ω) = Rt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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5.2. VERIFICATION OF THE CONDITIONS OF SION’S THEOREM
For the application of Sion’s theorem, we will consider a weak topology on Aac(F1t ) and A(F2t )
inherited from the space S. We will avoid specifying the filtration in the notation whenever it does not
lead to ambiguity, i.e., we will write Aac and A. In our arguments, we will often use that for convex sets
the weak and strong closedness are equivalent [8, Theorem 3.7] (although weak and strong convergence
are not equivalent, c.f. [8, Corollary 3.8]).
Lemma 5.15. For any filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft) satisfying the usual conditions, the set A(Gt) is weakly
compact in S.
Proof. We writeA forA(Gt) andA◦ forA◦(Gt). The setA is a subset of a ball in S. Since S is a reflexive
Banach space, this ball is weakly compact (Kakutani’s theorem, [8, Theorem 3.17]). Therefore, we only
need to show that A is weakly closed. Since A is convex, it is enough to show that A is strongly closed
[8, Theorem 3.7].
Take a sequence (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A that converges strongly in S to ρ. We will prove that ρ ∈ A by
constructing a càdlàg non-decreasing adapted process (ρˆt) such that ρˆ0− = 0, ρˆT = 1, and ρˆ = ρ
(λ × P)-a.e. With no loss of generality we can pass to the càdlàg representatives (ρˆn)n≥1 ⊂ A◦ which
also converge to ρ in S. Then, there is a subsequence (nk)k≥1 such that ρˆnkt → ρt (λ×P)-a.e. [8, Theorem
4.9].
Since ∫ t
0
P
(
lim
k→∞
ρˆnks = ρs
)
ds = t, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
we can find D¯ ⊂ [0, T ] with λ([0, T ] \ D¯) = 0 such that P(Ωt) = 1 for all t ∈ D¯, where
Ωt := {ω ∈ Ω : lim
k→∞
ρˆnkt (ω) = ρt(ω)}.
Then we can take a dense countable subset D ⊂ D¯ and define Ω0 := ∩t∈DΩt so that P(Ω0) = 1 and
lim
k→∞
ρˆnkt (ω) = ρt(ω), for all (t, ω) ∈ D × Ω0.
Since ρˆnk are non-decreasing, so is the mapping D 3 t 7→ ρt(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω0. Let us extend this
mapping to [0, T ] by defining ρˆt(ω) := ρt(ω) for t ∈ D and
ρˆt(ω) := lim
s∈D:s↓t
ρs(ω), ρˆ0−(ω) := 0, ρˆT (ω) := 1, for all ω ∈ Ω0,
where the limit exists due to monotonicity. For ω ∈ N := Ω \ Ω0, we set ρˆt(ω) = 0 for t < T and
ρˆT (ω) = 1. Notice that N ∈ G0 since P(N) = 0 so that ρˆt is Gt-measurable for t ∈ D. Moreover, ρˆ is
càdlàg by construction and ρˆt is measurable with respect to ∩s∈D,s>tGs = Gt+ = Gt for each t ∈ [0, T ]
by the right-continuity of the filtration. Hence, ρˆ is (Gt)-adapted and ρˆ ∈ A◦.
It remains to show that ρˆnk → ρˆ in S so that ρˆ = ρ (λ × P)-a.e. and therefore ρ ∈ A. It suffices to
show that ρˆnk → ρˆ (λ × P)-a.e. and then conclude by dominated convergence that ρˆnk → ρˆ in S. For
each ω ∈ Ω0 the process t 7→ ρˆ(ω) has at most countably many jumps (on any bounded interval) by
monotonicity, i.e., λ([0, T ] \ Cρˆ(ω)) = 0 (recall Definition 5.7). Moreover, arguing as in the proof of
Lemma 5.8, we conclude
lim
k→∞
ρˆnkt (ω) = ρˆt(ω), for all t ∈ Cρˆ(ω) and all ω ∈ Ω0.
Since (λ×P)({(t, ω) : t ∈ Cρˆ(ω)∩B,ω ∈ Ω0})=λ(B) for any bounded intervalB ⊆ [0, T ] then ρˆnk→ ρˆ
in S and A is strongly closed in S. 
Remark 5.16. Our space A(Gt) is the space of processes that generate randomised stopping times and
for any ρ ∈ A(Gt) we require that ρT (ω) = 1, for all ω ∈ Ω. In the finite horizon problem, i.e., T < ∞,
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such specification imposes a constraint that prevents a direct use of the topology induced by the norm
considered in [45]. Indeed, in [45] the space S is that of (Gt)-adapted processes ρ with
||ρ||2 := E
[ ∫ T
0
(ρt)
2dt+ (∆ρT )
2
]
<∞, ∆ρT := ρT − lim inf
t↑T
ρt.
The space of generating processes A(Gt) is not closed in the topology induced by ‖ · ‖ above: define a
sequence (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A(Gt) by
ρnt = n
(
t− T + 1
n
)+
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then ||ρn|| → 0 as n→∞ but ρ ≡ 0 /∈ A(Gt) since it fails to be equal to one at T (and it is not possible
to select a representative from A(Gt) with the equivalence relation induced by ‖ · ‖).
Lemma 5.17. Given any (ξ, ζ) ∈ Aac(F1t )×A(F2t ), the functionals N(ξ, ·) : A(F2t )→ R and N(·, ζ) :
Aac(F1t ) → R are, respectively, upper semicontinuous and lower semicontinuous in the strong topology
of S .
Proof. Recall from (9) that
N(ξ, ζ) = E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
.
Upper semicontinuity of N(ξ, ·). Fix ξ ∈ Aac(F1t ) and consider a sequence (ζn)n≥1 ⊂ A(F2t ) con-
verging to ζ ∈ A(F2t ) strongly in S. We have to show that
lim sup
n→∞
N(ξ, ζn) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).
Assume, by contradiction, that lim supn→∞N(ξ, ζn) > N(ξ, ζ). There is a subsequence (nk) over which
the limit on the left-hand side is attained. Along a further subsequence we have (P× λ)-a.e. convergence
of ζn to ζ [8, Theorem 4.9]. With an abuse of notation we will assume that the original sequence posesses
those two properties, i.e., the limit limn→∞N(ξ, ζn) exists and it strictly dominates N(ξ, ζ), and there is
(P× λ)-a.e. convergence of ζn to ζ.
Since ξ is absolutely continuous on [0, T ),
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζnt−)dξt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt
]
by the dominated convergence theorem. For the last two terms of N(ξ, ζn) we have
E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζnt + h∆ξT∆ζnT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt−)dζnt + h∆ξT∆ζnT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζnt + (h− gT )∆ξT∆ζnT
]
,
where the first equality is by absolute continuity of ξ and for the second one we used that 1− ξT− = ∆ξT .
From Lemma 5.8 and the boundedness and continuity of (ξt) we verify the assumptions of Proposition
5.10 (with Xt = gt(1− ξt−) therein), so
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζt
]
.
Recalling that gT ≤ h, we obtain from Lemma 5.9
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
(h− gT )∆ξT∆ζnT
] ≤ E[(h− gT )∆ξT∆ζT ].
Combining above convergence results contradicts limn→∞N(ξ, ζn) > N(ξ, ζ), hence, proves the upper
semicontinuity.
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Lower semicontinuity of N(·, ζ). Fix ζ ∈ A(F2t ) and consider a sequence (ξn)n≥1 ⊂ Aac(F1t ) con-
verging to ξ ∈ Aac(F1t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction as above, we assume that there is a
subsequence of ξn which we denote the same, with an abuse of notation, such that ξn → ξ (P × λ)-a.e.
and
(25) lim
n→∞N(ξ
n, ζ) < N(ξ, ζ).
By Lemma 5.8 and the continuity of (ξt) we have for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
lim
n→∞ ξ
n
t (ω) = ξt(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ).
Then by dominated convergence for the second term of N(ξn, ζ) we get
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξnt )dζt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζt
]
.
For the remaining terms of N(ξn, ζ), we have
E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξnt + h∆ξnT∆ζT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
ft(1− ζt−)dξnt + (h− fT )∆ξnT∆ζT
]
.
Observe that, by Lemma 5.9,
lim inf
n→∞
E
[
(h− fT )∆ξnT∆ζT
] ≥ E[(h− fT )∆ξT∆ζT ],
because h− fT ≤ 0. Further,
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
ft(1− ζt−)dξnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
ft(1− ζt−)dξt
]
by Proposition 5.12. The above results contradict (25), therefore, proving the lower semicontinuity. 
We are now ready to prove that the game with continuous randomisation for the first player (τ -player)
has a value.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. We will show that the conditions of Sion’s theorem hold (recall the notation in
Theorem 5.1) with (A,B) = (A(F2t ),Aac(F1t )) on the space S×S equipped with its weak topology. For
the sake of compactness of notation, we will writeA forA(F2t ) andAac forAac(F1t ). It is straightforward
to verify that the sets A and Aac are convex. Compactness of A in the weak topology of S follows from
Lemma 5.15. It remains to prove the convexity and semi-continuity properties of N with respect to the
weak topology of S. This is equivalent to showing that for any a ∈ R, ξˆ ∈ Aac and ζˆ ∈ A the level sets
K(ζˆ, a) = {ξ ∈ Aac : N(ξ, ζˆ) ≤ a} and Z(ξˆ, a) = {ζ ∈ A : N(ξˆ, ζ) ≥ a}
are convex and closed in Aac and A, respectively, with respect to the weak topology of S. For any
λ ∈ [0, 1] and ξ1, ξ2 ∈ Aac, ζ1, ζ2 ∈ A, using the expression in (9) it is immediate (by linearity) that
N(λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2, ζˆ) = λN(ξ1, ζˆ) + (1− λ)N(ξ2, ζˆ),
N(ξˆ, λζ1 + (1− λ)ζ2) = λN(ξˆ, ζ1) + (1− λ)N(ξˆ, ζ2).
This proves the convexity of the level sets. Their closedness in the strong topology of S is established
in Lemma 5.17. The latter two properties imply, by [8, Theorem 3.7], that the level sets are closed in
the weak topology of S. Sion’s theorem (Theorem 5.1) yields the existence of the value of the game:
W∗ = W ∗.
The second part of the statement results from using a version of Sion’s theorem proved in [27] which
allows to write max instead of sup in (11), i.e.,
sup
ζ∈A
inf
ξ∈Aac
N(ξ, ζ) = max
ζ∈A
inf
ξ∈Aac
N(ξ, ζ) = inf
ξ∈Aac
N(ξ, ζ∗),
where ζ∗ ∈ A delivers the maximum. 
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5.3. APPROXIMATION WITH CONTINUOUS CONTROLS
We now prove Proposition 5.5 by constructing a sequence (ξn) of Lipschitz continuous processes with
the Lipschitz constant for each process bounded by n for all ω. This uniform bound on the Lipschitz
constant is not used in this paper as we only need that each of the processes (ξnt ) has absolutely continuous
trajectories with respect to the Lebesgue measure on [0, T ) so that it belongs to Aac(F1t ).
Proof of Proposition 5.5. Fix ζ ∈ A(F2t ). It is sufficient to show that for any ξ ∈ A(F1t ), there exists a
sequence (ξn)n≥1 ⊂ Aac(F1t ) such that
(26) lim sup
n→∞
N(ξn, ζ) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).
We will explicitly construct absolutely continuous ξn that approximate ξ in a suitable sense. AsN(ξ, ζ)
does not depend on the choice of càdlàg representatives, by Definition 5.2, without loss of generality we
assume that ξ ∈ A◦(F1t ) and ζ ∈ A◦(F2t ). Define a function φnt = nt∧ 1∨ 0. Let ξnt =
∫
[0,t] φ
n
t−sdξs for
t ∈ [0, T ), and ξnT = 1. We shall show that (ξnt ) are n-Lipschitz, hence absolutely continuous on [0, T ).
Note that φnt ≡ 0 for t ≤ 0, and therefore ξnt =
∫
[0,T ] φ
n
t−sdξs for t ∈ [0, T ). For arbitrary t1, t2 ∈ [0, T )
we have
|ξnt1 − ξnt2 | =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
[0,T ]
(φnt1−s − φnt2−s)dξs
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∫
[0,T ]
|φnt1−s − φnt2−s|dξs
≤
∫
[0,T ]
n|(t1 − s)− (t2 − s)|dξs =
∫
[0,T ]
n|t1 − t2|dξs = n|t1 − t2|,
where the first inequality is Jensen’s inequality (which is applicable since ξ(ω) is a cumulative distribution
function on [0, T ] for each ω), and the second inequality follows by the definition of φn.
We will verify the assumptions of Proposition 5.13. Clearly the sequence (ξn) is non-decreasing in
n, as the measure dξ(ω) is positive for each ω ∈ Ω and the sequence φn is non-decreasing. By the
construction of ξn we have ξn0 = 0→ ξ0− as n→∞. Moreover, for any t ∈ (0, T ) and n > 1/t
ξnt =
∫
[0,t)
φnt−sdξs = ξt− 1n
+
∫
(t− 1n ,t)
n(t− s)dξs
where the first equality uses that φn0 = 0, so that jumps of ξ at time t give zero contribution, and the second
one uses the definition of φn. Letting n → ∞ we obtain ξnt → ξt− as the second term above vanishes
since
0 ≤
∫
(t− 1n ,t)
n(t− s)dξs ≤ ξt− − ξ
t− 1n
→ 0.
Proposition 5.13 implies that
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt)dξt
]
,
and limn→∞ ξnT− = ξT− so that
lim
n→∞∆ξ
n
T = ∆ξT
since ξnT = 1 for all n ≥ 1. The dominated convergence theorem (applied to the second integral below)
also yields
(27)
lim
n→∞N(ξ
n, ζ) = lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξnt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξnt )dζt + h∆ξnT∆ζT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt−)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
.
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Note that
N(ξ, ζ) = E
[∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
= E
[∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt−)dζt +
∑
0≤t<T
(ft − gt)∆ζt∆ξt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
(28)
≥ E
[∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt−)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
,
where the last inequality is due to Assumption (A3). Combining this with (27) completes the proof of
(26). 
5.4. RELAXATION OF ASSUMPTION (A2)
Assumption (A2) which requires that the payoff processes are regular can be relaxed to allow for pre-
dictable jumps. In this section we extend Theorem 5.4 and Proposition 5.5 to the case of assumption (A2’)
with the payoff process (gt) having non-negative predictable jumps, i.e., (gˆt) from the decomposition in
(A2’) being non-decreasing. Arguments when (fˆt) is non-increasing (the payoff process (ft) has non-
positive predictable jumps) are analogous. However, in that case, we define the analogue of problem (11)
where the second player (maximiser) uses absolutely continuous generating processes ζ ∈ Aac(F2t ) and
the first player (minimiser) picks ξ ∈ A(F1t ).
Theorem 5.18. Under assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5), (with gˆ non-decreasing) the game (11) has a
value, i.e.
W∗ = W ∗ := W.
Moreover, the ζ-player (maximiser) has an optimal strategy, i.e. there exists ζ∗ ∈ A(F2t ) such that
inf
ξ∈Aac(F1t )
N(ξ, ζ∗) = W.
Proposition 5.19. Under assumptions (A1), (A2’), (A3)-(A5), (with gˆ non-decreasing) for any ζ ∈ A(F2t )
and ξ ∈ A(F1t ), there is a sequence ξn ∈ Aac(F1t ) such that
lim sup
n→∞
N(ξn, ζ) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).
Proof of Theorem 2.4. The proof is identical to the proof Theorem 2.5 but with references to Theorem
5.4 and Proposition 5.5 replaced by the above results. 
In the rest of the section we prove Theorem 5.18 and Proposition 5.19. Processes fˆ , gˆ have the following
decomposition according to Theorem VI.52 in [13] and remarks thereafter: there are (Ft)-stopping times
(ηfk )k≥1 and (η
g
k)k≥1, non-negative Fηfk -measurable random variables X
f
k , k ≥ 1, and non-negative Fηgk -
measurable random variables Xgk , k ≥ 1, such that
(29) fˆt =
∞∑
k=1
(−1)kXfk I{t≥ηfk}, gˆt =
∞∑
k=1
XgkI{t≥ηgk}.
The alternating terms in the sum for (fˆt) come from interweaving sequences for the two non-decreasing
processes (fˆ+t ) and (fˆ
−
t ) fromLb arising from the decomposition of the finite variation process (fˆt) (recall
fˆt = fˆ
+
t − fˆ−t ). This is for notational convenience and resulting in no mathematical complications as the
infinite sum is absolutely convergent. Recall that gˆ is assumed non-decreasing.
The condition that fˆ0 = gˆ0 = 0 means that η
f
k , η
g
k > 0 for all k ≥ 1. Since fˆ , gˆ have integrable
variation (in the sense of [13, p. 115]), the infinite sequences in (29) are dominated by integrable random
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variables Xf and Xg: for any t ∈ [0, T ]
|fˆt| ≤ Xf :=
∞∑
k=1
Xfk , and gˆt ≤ Xgt :=
∞∑
k=1
Xgk .(30)
To handle convergence of integrals with piecewise constant processes, we need to extend the results of
Proposition 5.10.
Proposition 5.20. For a filtration (Gt) ⊆ (Ft), consider (ρn)n≥1 ⊂ A˜◦(Gt) and ρ ∈ A˜◦(Gt) with
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞ ρ
n
t (ω) = ρt(ω), for all t ∈ Cρ(ω) ∪ {T}
})
= 1.
Then for any F-measurable random variables θ ∈ (0, T ] and X ∈ [0,∞) with E[X] <∞ we have
(31) lim sup
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
I{t≥θ}Xdρnt
]
≤ E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
I{t≥θ}Xdρt
]
.
Furthermore, if P({ω : θ(ω) ∈ Cρ(ω) or X(ω) = 0}) = 1, then
(32) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
I{t≥θ}Xdρnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
I{t≥θ}Xdρt
]
.
Proof. Let Ω0 be the set of ω ∈ Ω for which ρnt (ω) → ρt(ω) for all t ∈ Cρ(ω) ∪ {T}. Fix ω ∈ Ω0. For
any t such that t ∈ Cρ(ω) and t < θ(ω) (such t always exists as θ(ω) > 0 and ρ has countably many
jumps on any bounded interval) we have ρnt (ω) ≤ ρnθ(ω)−(ω) so that by assumption
lim inf
n→∞
ρnθ(ω)−(ω) ≥ ρt(ω).
Since Cρ(ω) is dense in (0, T ), by arbitrariness of t < θ(ω) we have
(33) lim inf
n→∞
ρnθ(ω)−(ω) ≥ ρθ(ω)−(ω).
We rewrite the integral as follows:
∫
[0,T ] I{t≥θ}Xdρ
n
t = X(ρ
n
T − ρnθ−). Therefore,
lim sup
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
I{t≥θ}Xdρnt
]
= lim sup
n→∞
E
[
X(ρnT − ρnθ−)
]
= lim sup
n→∞
E[XρnT ]− lim inf
n→∞
E[Xρnθ−].
The dominated convergence theorem yields that limn→∞ E[XρnT ] = E[XρT ], while applying Fubini’s
theorem gives
lim inf
n→∞
E[Xρnθ−] ≥ E[lim inf
n→∞
Xρnθ−] ≥ E[Xρθ−],
where the last inequality is by (33). Combining the above estimates completes the proof of (31).
Assume now that θ(ω) ∈ Cρ(ω) or X(ω) = 0 for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω0. This and the dominated convergence
theorem yield
E[X(ρT − ρθ−)] = E[X(ρT − ρθ)] = lim
n→∞E[X(ρ
n
T − ρnθ )] ≤ lim sup
n→∞
E[X(ρnT − ρnθ−)],
where the last inequality follows from the monotonicity of ρn. This estimate and (31) prove (32). 
Proof of Theorem 5.18. Compared to the proof of the analogue result under the more stringent condition
(A2) (i.e., Theorem 5.4), we only need to establish lower and upper semicontinuity of the functional N ,
while all other remaining arguments stay valid. For the semicontinuity, we extend arguments of Lemma
5.17.
Upper semicontinuity of N(ξ, ·). Fix ξ ∈ Aac(F1t ) and consider a sequence (ζn)n≥1 ∈ A(F2t ) con-
verging to ζ ∈ A(F2t ) strongly in S. Arguing by contradiction, we assume that there is a subsequence of
(ζn)n≥1 denoted the same with an abuse of notation, that converges (P× λ)-a.e. to ζ and such that
lim
n→∞N(ξ, ζ
n) > N(ξ, ζ).
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Without loss of generality, we can further require that (ζn)n≥1 ⊂ A◦(F2t ) and ζ ∈ A◦(F2t ). Since ξ is
absolutely continuous on [0, T ),
(34) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζnt−)dξt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt
]
by the dominated convergence theorem. For the last two terms of N(ξ, ζn) (recall (9)) we have
E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζnt + h∆ξT∆ζnT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζnt + (h− gT )∆ξT∆ζnT
]
.
As in the proof of Lemma 5.17, for the regular part g˜ of the process g we have
(35) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
g˜t(1− ξt−)dζnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
g˜t(1− ξt−)dζt
]
.
For the pure jump part gˆ of the process g, we will prove that
(36) lim sup
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gˆt(1− ξt−)dζnt
]
≤ E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gˆt(1− ξt−)dζt
]
.
To this end, let us define
Rnt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ξs−)dζns , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ξs−)dζs, for t ∈ [0, T ],
with Rn0− = R0− = 0 and then we are going to apply Proposition 5.20 with Rn and R instead of ρn and
ρ. We need Rnt (ω) → Rt(ω) as n → ∞ for t ∈ CR(ω) := Cζ(ω) ∪ {t ∈ [0, T ] : ξt(ω) = 1}, for P-a.e.
ω ∈ Ω. The latter is indeed true. Setting Ω0 = {ω ∈ Ω : limn→∞ ζnt (ω) = ζt(ω) ∀ t ∈ Cζ(ω)}, we have
P(Ω0) = 1 by Lemma 5.8. For any ω ∈ Ω0 and t ∈ Cζ(ω), invoking the absolute continuity of (ξt), we
obtain (omitting the dependence on ω)
lim
n→∞R
n
t = limn→∞
[
(1− ξt)ζnt +
∫
[0,t]
ζns dξs
]
= (1− ξt)ζt +
∫
[0,t]
ζsdξs = Rt,
where the convergence of the second term is the consequence of the dominated convergence theorem and
the fact that λ([0, T ] \ Cζ(ω)) = 0 and ζnT = ζT = 1.
Then, for any k ≥ 1 Proposition 5.20 gives
(37) lim sup
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
≤ E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dRt
]
.
Noting that Xgk ≥ 0 we first apply the decomposition of gˆ and the monotone convergence theorem
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gˆt(1− ξt−)dζnt
]
= E
[ ∞∑
k=1
∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
.
Since gˆ ∈ Lb we have the bound (recall (30))
∞∑
k=1
sup
n
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
≤
∞∑
k=1
E[Xgk ] <∞.
Then we can apply (reverse) Fatou’s lemma (with respect to the counting measure on N)
lim sup
n→∞
∞∑
k=1
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
≤
∞∑
k=1
lim sup
n→∞
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dR
n
t
]
≤
∞∑
k=1
E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
XgkI{t≥ηgk}dRt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
gˆt(1− ξt−)dζt
]
,
where the last inequality is due to (37) and the final equality follows by monotone convergence and the
decomposition of gˆ. This completes the proof of (36).
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Recalling that gT ≤ h, we obtain from Lemma 5.9
lim sup
n→∞
E
[
(h− gT )∆ξT∆ζnT
] ≤ E[(h− gT )∆ξT∆ζT ]
and combining the latter with (35), (36) and (34) shows that
lim sup
n→∞
N(ξ, ζn) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).(38)
Hence we have a contradiction with limn→∞N(ξ, ζn) > N(ξ, ζ), which proves the upper semicontinuity.
Lower semicontinuity of N(·, ζ). The proof follows closely the argument of the proof of Lemma 5.17:
we fix ζ ∈ A(F2t ), consider a sequence (ξn)n≥1 ⊂ Aac(F1t ) converging to ξ ∈ Aac(F1t ) strongly in S ,
and argue by contradiction that (25) holds. We only show how to handle the convergence for (fˆt) as all
other terms are handled by the proof of Lemma 5.17.
By Lemma 5.8 and the continuity of (ξt) we have P
(
limn→∞ ξnt (ω) = ξt(ω) ∀ t ∈ [0, T )
)
= 1. Let
Rnt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ζt−)dξnt , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ζt−)dξt,
with Rn0− = R0− = 0. Due to the continuity of (ξnt ) and (ξt) for t ∈ [0, T ), processes (Rnt ) and (Rt) are
continuous on [0, T ) with a possible jump at T . From (18) in the proof of Proposition 5.12 we conclude
that for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
lim
n→∞R
n
t (ω) = Rt(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since ∆fˆT = 0 (see Assumption (A2’)), there is a decomposition such that X
f
k I{ηfk=T}
= 0 P-a.s. for all
k. Recalling that (Rt) is continuous on [0, T ), we can apply (32) in Proposition 5.20: for any k ≥ 1
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xfk I{t≥ηfk}
dRnt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
Xfk I{t≥ηfk}
dRt
]
.
Combining the latter with the decomposition (29) and dominated convergence theorem (with the bound
Xf ) we obtain
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
fˆtdR
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
fˆtdRt
]
.
This, together with an identical result for (f˜t) that follows from the arguments in the proof of Lemma
5.17, shows that
(39) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
ftdR
n
t
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T ]
ftdRt
]
,
and the rest of the proof of lower semicontinuity from Lemma 5.17 applies. 
Remark 5.21. The inequality (31) in Proposition 5.20 can be strict even if ρnt → ρt for all t ∈ [0, T ]
because this condition does not imply that ρnt− → ρt−. One needs further continuity assumptions on (ρt)
to establish equality (32). This is why (36) is not true for gˆ with negative jumps while fˆ is allowed to be a
general finite variation pure-jump process in (39).
Remark 5.22. The assumption that the payoff process (gt) does not have predictable negative jumps
cannot be further relaxed as this may cause the proof of the upper semi-continuity in Theorem 5.18 to fail.
Recall that the process (gt) corresponds to the payoff of the second player and her strategy (ζt) is not
required to be absolutely continuous. For example, fix t0 ∈ (0, T ) and take gt = 1− I{t≥t0}, ζt = I{t≥t0}
and ξt = I{t=T}. Let us consider the sequence ζnt = I{t≥t0− 1n}, which converges to ζ pointwise and also
strongly in S. We have∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζnt ≡ 1, for all n’s, but
∫
[0,T ]
gt(1− ξt−)dζt ≡ 0,
hence (36) fails and so does (38).
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Proof of Proposition 5.19. Here, we also only show how to extend the proof of Proposition 5.5 to the more
general setting. Fix ζ ∈ A◦(F2t ) and ξ ∈ A◦(F1t ). Construct a sequence (ξn) ⊂ A◦ac(F1t ) as in the proof
of Proposition 5.5. It is sufficient to show that
(40) lim sup
n→∞
N(ξn, ζ) ≤ N(ξ, ζ).
From the proof of Proposition 5.5 we have that
(41)
lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
f˜t(1− ζt−)dξnt +
∫
[0,T )
g˜t(1− ξnt )dζt + h∆ξnT∆ζT
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
f˜t(1− ζt)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
g˜t(1− ξt−)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
.
For t ∈ [0, T ], define
Rnt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ζs−)dξns , Rt =
∫
[0,t]
(1− ζs)dξs
with Rn0− = R0− = 0. Corollary 5.14 implies that for P-a.e. ω ∈ Ω
lim
n→∞R
n
t−(ω) = Rt−(ω) for all t ∈ [0, T ].(42)
By the decomposition of (fˆt) in (29) and the dominated convergence theorem for the infinite sum (recalling
(30)) we obtain
E
[ ∫
[0,T )
fˆt(1− ζt−)dξnt
]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[
(−1)k
∫
[0,T )
Xfk I{t≥ηfk}
dRnt
]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[
(−1)kXfk (RnT− −Rnηfk−)
]
.
We further apply dominated convergence (with respect to the product of the counting measure on N and
to the measure P) to obtain
(43)
lim
n→∞E
[∫
[0,T )
fˆt(1− ζt−)dξnt
]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[
(−1)k lim
n→∞X
f
k (R
n
T− −Rnηfk−)
]
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[
(−1)kXfk (RT− −Rηfk−)
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
fˆt(1− ζt)dξt
]
,
where the second equality uses (42) and the final one the decomposition of fˆ . Recalling that ξnt → ξt− as
n→∞ by construction, dominated convergence gives
(44) lim
n→∞E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gˆt(1− ξnt )dζt
]
= E
[ ∫
[0,T )
gˆt(1− ξt−)dζt
]
.
Putting together (41), (43) and (44) shows
lim
n→∞N(ξ
n, ζ) = E
[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt−)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
]
.
It remains to notice that by (28) the right hand side is dominated by N(ξ, ζ), which completes the proof
of (40). 
5.5. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.6
Randomisation devices Zτ and Zσ associated to a pair (τ, σ) ∈ T R(F1t ) × T R(F2t ) are independent
of G. Denoting by (ξt) ∈ A◦(F1t ) and (ζt) ∈ A◦(F2t ) the generating processes for τ and σ, respectively,
the statement of Proposition 4.3 can be extended to encompass the conditional functional (4):
(45) E
[
P (τ, σ)
∣∣G] = E[ ∫
[0,T )
ft(1− ζt−)dξt +
∫
[0,T )
gt(1− ξt)dζt + h∆ξT∆ζT
∣∣∣∣G].
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We can also repeat the same argument as in Remark 4.4 to obtain that
V := ess sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
ess inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G] = ess sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
ess inf
τ∈T (F1t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G]
and
V := ess inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
ess sup
σ∈T R(F2t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G] = ess inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
ess sup
σ∈T (F2t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G].
Notice that V ≥ V , P-a.s. We will show that
E[V ] = E[V ](46)
so that V = V , P-a.s. as needed.
In order to prove (46), let us define
M(τ) := ess sup
σ∈T (F2t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G], for τ ∈ T R(F1t )
and
M(σ) := ess inf
τ∈T (F1t )
E
[P(τ, σ)∣∣G], for σ ∈ T R(F2t ).
These are two standard optimal stopping problems and the theory of Snell envelope applies (see, e.g., [24,
Appendix D] and [19]). We adapt some results from that theory to suit our needs in the game setting.
Lemma 5.23. The family {M(τ), τ ∈ T R(F1t )} is downward directed and the family {M(σ), σ ∈
T R(F2t )} is upward directed.
Proof. Let τ (1), τ (2) ∈ T R(F1t ) and let ξ(1), ξ(2) ∈ A◦(F1t ) be the corresponding generating processes.
Fix the G-measurable event B = {M(τ (1)) ≤ M(τ (2))} and define another (F1t )-randomised stopping
time as τˆ = τ (1)IB + τ (2)IBc . We use G ⊂ F10 to ensure that τˆ ∈ T R(F1t ). The generating process of
τˆ reads ξˆt = ξ
(1)
t IB + ξ
(2)
t IBc for t ∈ [0, T ]. Using the linear structure of ξˆ and recalling (45), for any
σ ∈ T (F2t ) we have
E
[P(τˆ , σ)|G] =IBE[ ∫
[0,T )
I{u≤σ}fudξ(1)u + gσ(1− ξ(1)σ )) + h∆ξ(1)T I{σ=T}
∣∣∣∣G]
+ IBcE
[ ∫
[0,T )
I{u≤σ}fudξ(2)u + gσ(1− ξ(2)σ )) + h∆ξ(2)T I{σ=T}
∣∣∣∣G]
=IBE
[P(τ (1), σ)|G]+ IBcE[P(τ (2), σ)|G]
≤IBM(τ (1)) + IBcM(τ (2)) = M(τ (1)) ∧M(τ (2)),
where the inequality is by definition of essential supremum and the final equality by definition of the event
B. Thus, taking supremum over σ ∈ T (F2t ) we get
M(τˆ) ≤M(τ (1)) ∧M(τ (2)),
hence the family {M(τ), τ ∈ T R(F1t )} is downward directed. A symmetric argument proves that the
family {M(σ), σ ∈ T R(F2t )} is upward directed. 
An immediate consequence of the lemma and of the definition of essential supremum/infimum is that
(see, e.g., [34, Lemma I.1.3]) we can find sequences (σn)n≥1 ⊂ T R(F2t ) and (τn)n≥1 ⊂ T R(F1t ) such
that P-a.s.
V = lim
n→∞M(τn) and V = limn→∞M(σn),(47)
where the convergence is monotone in both cases.
Analogous results hold for the optimisation problems defining M(τ) and M(σ). The proof of the
following lemma is similar to that of Lemma 5.23 and omitted.
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Lemma 5.24. The family {E[P(τ, σ)|G], σ ∈ T (F2t )} is upward directed for each τ ∈ T R(F1t ). The
family {E[P(τ, σ)|G], τ ∈ T (F1t )} is downward directed for each σ ∈ T R(F2t ).
It follows that for each τ ∈ T R(F1t ) and σ ∈ T R(F2t ), there are sequences (στn)n≥1 ⊂ T (F2t ) and
(τσn )n≥1 ⊂ T (F1t ) such that
M(τ) = lim
n→∞E
[P(τ, στn)|G] and M(σ) = limn→∞E[P(τσn , σ)|G],(48)
where the convergence is monotone in both cases. Equipped with these results we can prove the following
lemma which will quickly lead to (46).
Lemma 5.25. Recall V∗ and V ∗ as in Definition 2.3. We have
(49) E[V ] = V ∗, and E[V ] = V∗.
Proof. Fix τ ∈ T R(F1t ). By (48) and the monotone convergence theorem
E[M(τ)] = lim
n→∞E[P(τ, σ
τ
n)] ≤ sup
σ∈T (F2t )
E[P(τ, σ)].
The opposite inequality follows from the fact that M(τ) ≥ E[P(τ, σ)|G] for any σ ∈ T (F2t ) by the
definition of the essential supremum. Therefore, we have
(50) E[M(τ)] = sup
σ∈T (F2t )
E[P(τ, σ)].
From (47), similar arguments as above prove that
(51) E[V ] = inf
τ∈T R(F1t )
E[M(τ)].
Combining (50) and (51) completes the proof that E[V ] = V ∗. The second part of the statement requires
analogous arguments. 
Finally, (49) and Theorem 2.4 imply (46), which concludes the proof of Theorem 2.6.
6. COUNTEREXAMPLES
In the three subsections below we show that: (a) relaxing condition (A4) may lead to a game without
a value, (b) in situations where one player has all the informational advantage, the use of randomised
stopping times may still be beneficial also for the uninformed player, and (c) assumption (A2’) is tight in
requiring that either (fˆt) is non-increasing or (gˆt) is non-decreasing.
In order to keep the exposition simple we consider the framework of Section 3.1 with I = 2, J = 1,
and impose that (Fpt ) be the trivial filtration (hence all payoff processes are deterministic, since they are
(Fpt )-adapted). Furthermore we restrict to the case in which f1,1 = f2,1 = f and g1,1 = g2,1 = g. Only
the terminal payoff depends on the scenario, i.e., h1,1 6= h2,1 (both deterministic).
Notice that only the first player (minimiser) observes the true value of I, so she has a strict informational
advantage over the second player (maximiser). The second player will be referred to as uninformed player
while the first player as an informed player.
We denote by T R the set of (Fpt )-randomised stopping times. The informed player chooses two ran-
domised stopping times τ1, τ2 (one for each scenario) with the generating processes ξ1, ξ2 which, due to
the triviality of the filtration (Fpt ), are deterministic functions. Pure stopping times are constants in [0, T ].
Similarly, the uninformed player’s randomised stopping time σ has generating process a deterministic
function ζ.
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6.1. A GAME WITHOUT A VALUE WHEN (A4) FAILS
Let us consider specific payoff functions
f ≡ 1, gt = 1
2
t, h1 := h1,1 = 2, h2 := h2,1 = 0,
and let us also set T = 1, pi1 = pi2 = 12 .
Proposition 6.1. In the example of this subsection we have
V∗ ≤ 1
2
, and V ∗ >
1
2
,
so the game does not have a value.
Proof. First we show that V∗ ≤ 12 , i.e., that for any σ ∈ T R, there exist τ1, τ2 ∈ T R such that
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≤ 12 . We will use the fact that (c.f. Remark 4.4)
V∗ = sup
σ∈T R
inf
τ1,τ2∈T R
N((τ1, τ2), σ) = sup
σ∈T R
inf
τ1,τ2∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ),
and will bound the right-hand side of this expression with 12 from above. Take any σ ∈ T R and the corre-
sponding generating process (ζt) which is, due to the triviality of the filtration (Fpt ), also a deterministic
function. For τ1 ∈ [0, 1), τ2 = 1 we obtain
N((τ1, τ2), σ) = E
[
(
1
2
σI{σ<τ1} + 1 · I{σ≥τ1})I{I=1} + (
1
2
σI{σ<1} + 0 · I{σ=1})I{I=2}
]
≤ 1
2
(
1
2
ζτ1− + (1− ζτ1−)) +
1
4
ζ1− =
1
2
− 1
4
ζτ1− +
1
4
ζ1−,
where we used that σ is bounded above by 1 and that I is independent of σ with P(I = 1) = P(I = 2) =
1
2 . In particular,
inf
τ1,τ2∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≤ lim
τ1→1−
N((τ1, 1), σ) =
1
2
.
This proves that V∗ ≤ 12 .
Now we turn our attention to demonstrating that V ∗ > 12 , i.e., that for any τ1, τ2 ∈ T R, there exists
σ ∈ T R such that N((τ1, τ2), σ) > 12 . Noting again that
V ∗ = inf
τ1,τ2∈T R
sup
σ∈T R
N(τ1, τ2, σ) = inf
τ1,τ2∈T R
sup
σ∈[0,1]
N(τ1, τ2, σ),
we can restrict our attention to constant σ ∈ [0, 1]. Take any τ1, τ2 ∈ T R and the corresponding generating
processes (ξ1t ), (ξ
2
t ) which are also deterministic functions.
Take any δ ∈ (0, 1/2). If ξ11− > δ, then for any σ < 1 we have
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ E
[(
1 · I{τ1≤σ} +
1
2
σI{σ<τ1}
)
I{I=1} +
1
2
σI{I=2}
]
= E
[(
ξ1σ +
1
2
σ(1− ξ1σ)
)
I{I=1} +
1
2
σI{I=2}
]
=
1
2
ξ1σ −
1
4
σξ1σ +
1
2
σ =
1
2
ξ1σ(1−
1
2
σ) +
1
2
σ
and, in particular,
sup
σ∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ lim
σ→1−
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ 1
4
ξ11− +
1
2
≥ 1
2
+
1
4
δ.
On the other hand, if ξ11− ≤ δ, taking σ = 1 yields
sup
σ∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ N((τ1, τ2), 1) ≥ E[2 · I{τ1=1}I{I=1}] = 1− ξ11− ≥ 1− δ >
1
2
.
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FIGURE 1. Payoff functions f in blue, g in orange.
This completes the proof that V ∗ > 12 . 
6.2. NECESSITY OF RANDOMIZATION
Here we argue that randomisation is not only sufficient in order to find the value in Dynkin games
with asymmetric information but in many cases it is also necessary. In [11] there is a rare example of
explicit construction of equilibrium strategies for a zero-sum Dynkin game with asymmetric information
in a diffusive set-up (see Section 3.2 above for details). The peculiarity of the solution in [11] lies in the
fact that the informed player uses a randomised stopping time whereas the uninformed player sticks to a
pure stopping time. An interpretation of that result suggests that the informed player uses randomisation to
‘hide information’ about the scenario in which the game is being played, in order to induce the uninformed
player to act in a certain desirable way. Since the uninformed player has ‘nothing to hide’ one may be
tempted to draw a general conclusion that she should never use randomised stopping rules. However,
Proposition 6.2 below shows that such conclusion would be wrong in general and even the uninformed
player may benefit from randomisation of stopping times.
We consider specific payoff functions f and g plotted on Figure 1. Their analytic formulae read
ft = (10t+ 4)I{t∈[0, 1
10
)} + 5I{t∈[ 1
10
,1]}, gt = (15t− 6)I{t∈[ 2
5
, 1
2
)} + (9− 15t)I{t∈[ 1
2
, 3
5
)}
with
h1 := h1,1 = 0 = g1−, h2 := h2,1 = 5 = f1−.
We also set T = 1, pi1 = pi2 = 12 . As above, we identify randomized strategies with their generating
processes. In particular, we denote by ζ the generating process for σ ∈ T R.
By Theorem 2.5, the game has a value in randomised strategies, i.e., V ∗ = V∗. Restriction of the
uninformed player’s (player 2) strategies to pure stopping times affects only the lower value, see Remark
4.4. The lower value of the game in which player 2 is restricted to using pure stopping times reads
V̂∗ := sup
σ∈[0,1]
inf
τ1,τ2∈T R
N((τ1, τ2), σ) = sup
σ∈[0,1]
inf
(τ1,τ2)∈[0,1]2
N((τ1, τ2), σ),
where the equality is again due to Remark 4.4 (notice that here all pure stopping times are (Fpt )-stopping
times hence deterministic, because (Fpt ) is trivial). As the following proposition shows, V̂∗ < V∗, so the
game in which the uninformed player does not randomise does not have a value. This confirms that the
randomisation can play a strategic role beyond hiding information.
Proposition 6.2. In the example of this subsection, we have
V∗ > V̂∗.
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Proof. First, notice that
V̂∗ ≤ sup
σ∈[0,T ]
N(τˆ(σ), σ),
where we take
τˆ(σ) = (τ1(σ), τ2(σ)) =
{
(1, 1), for σ ∈ [0, 1),
(1, 0), for σ = 1.
It is easy to verify that supσ∈[0,1]N(τˆ(σ), σ) = 2.
We will show that the σ-player can ensure a strictly larger payoff by using a randomised strategy. Define
ζt = aI{t≥ 1
2
}+(1−a)I{t=1}, i.e., the corresponding σ ∈ T R prescribes to ‘stop at time 12 with probability
a and at time 1 with probability 1 − a’. The value of the parameter a ∈ [0, 1] will be determined below.
We claim that
(52) inf
(τ1,τ2)∈[0,1]2
N((τ1, τ2), ζ) = N((1, 0), ζ) ∧N((1, 1), ζ).
Assuming that the above is true, we calculate
N((1, 0), ζ) = 2 +
3
4
a, N((1, 1), ζ) =
5
2
− a.
Picking a = 27 the above quantities are equal to
31
14 . Hence V∗ ≥ 3114 > 2.
It remains to prove (52). Recall that ζt = aI{t≥ 1
2
} + (1 − a)I{t=1} is the generating process of σ and
the expected payoff reads
N((τ1, τ2), ζ) =
2∑
i=1
E
[
I{I=i}
(
fτiI{τi≤σ}∩{τi<1} + gσI{σ<τi}∩{σ<1} + h
iI{τi=σ=1}
) ]
.
It is clear that on the event {I = 1} the infimum is attained for τ1 = 1, irrespective of the choice of ζ. On
the event {I = 2} the informed player would only stop either at time zero, where the function f attains
the minimum cost f0 = 4, or at time t > 1/2 since ζ only puts mass at t = 1/2 and at t = 1 (the informed
player knows her opponent may stop at t = 1/2 with probability a). The latter strategy corresponds to
a payoff 5 − 7/2a and can also be achieved by picking τ2 = 1. Then the informed player needs only to
consider the expected payoff associated to the strategies (τ1, τ2) = (1, 0) and (τ1, τ2) = (1, 1), so that
(52) holds. 
6.3. NECESSITY OF ASSUMPTION (A2’)
Our final counter-example shows that violating Assumption (A2’) by allowing both predictable upward
jumps of f and predictable downward jumps of g may also lead to a game without a value.
Consider the payoffs
ft = 1 + 2I{t≥ 1
2
}, gt = −I{t≥ 1
2
}, h
1 = h1,1 = 3, h2 = h2,1 = −1
so that h1 = f1− and h2 = g1− and let us also set T = 1, pi1 = pi2 = 12 . Assumption (A2’) is violated as
g has a predictable downward jump and f has a predictable upward jump at time t = 12 .
Proposition 6.3. In the example of this subsection we have
V∗ ≤ 0, and V ∗ > 0,
so the game does not have a value.
Proof. First we show that V∗ ≤ 0. For this step, it is sufficient to restrict our attention to pure stopping
times τ1, τ2 ∈ [0, 1] for the informed player (cf. Remark 4.4). Let σ ∈ T R with a (deterministic)
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generating process (ζt) and fix ε ∈ (0, 12). For τ1 = 12 − ε and τ2 = 1 we obtain
N((τ1, τ2), σ) = E
[
I{I=1}(0 · I{σ<τ1} + 1 · I{σ≥τ1}) + I{I=2}(0 · I{σ< 1
2
} − 1 · I{σ≥ 1
2
})
]
=
1
2
(
1− ζ( 1
2
−ε)−
)− 1
2
(
1− ζ 1
2
−
)
.
Therefore, using that (ζt) has càdlàg trajectories we have
inf
(τ1,τ2)∈[0,1]2
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≤ lim
ε→0
1
2
· (ζ 1
2
− − ζ( 1
2
−ε)−) = 0.
Since the result holds for all σ ∈ T R we have V∗ ≤ 0.
Next, we demonstrate that V ∗ > 0. For this step it is sufficient to consider pure stopping times σ ∈ [0, 1]
for the uninformed player (Remark 4.4). Let τ1, τ2 ∈ T R and let ξ1, ξ2 be the associated (deterministic)
generating processes. Consider first the case in which ξ11
2
− ∧ ξ21
2
− > δ for some δ ∈ (0, 1) and fix
ε ∈ (0, 12). For σ = 12 − ε we have
N((τ1, τ2), σ) = E
[
I{I=1}(1 · I{τ1≤σ} + 0 · I{σ<τ1}) + I{I=2}(1 · I{τ2≤σ} + 0 · I{σ<τ2})
]
=
1
2
(
ξ11
2
−ε + ξ
2
1
2
−ε
)
,
thus implying
(53) sup
σ∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ lim
σ→ 1
2
−
N((τ1, τ2), σ) =
1
2
(ξ11
2
− + ξ
2
1
2
−) > δ > 0.
If, instead, ξ11
2
− ∨ ξ21
2
− ≤ δ, then
(54)
sup
σ∈[0,1]
N((τ1, τ2), σ) ≥ N((τ1, τ2), 1)
≥ E[I{I=1}(1 · I{τ1< 12} + 3 · I{τ1≥ 12}) + I{I=2}(−1)]
≥ 1
2
(
ξ11
2
− + 3
(
1− ξ11
2
−
))− 1
2
= 1− ξ11
2
− ≥ 1− δ > 0.
Combining (53) and (54) we have V ∗ > 0. 
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